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13. Consolidation Anarchy II: The Street-Fighter
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The Street Fighter • 151 Thirteen Consolidation Anarchy II: The Street-Fighter Frank E. Taplin, the rugged, sandy-haired son of a Rockefeller lieutenant, grew up in Cleveland and first served time as an office boy for Standard Oil. At age 21, he moved over to the coal business and eventually owned coal properties in Ohio, West Virginia, and western Pennsylvania—including an extensive operation on the Pittsburgh & West Virginia (P&WV). Taplin seemed to have a talent for getting into things at the right time. Just as he was expanding his coal-producing business, the world went to war and Taplin emerged with a fortune. He also had a talent for fighting rough. Aided by his attorney brother Charles, he developed a taste for aggressive litigation, successfully suing the Pittsburgh & West Virginia for discrimination in favoring its own coal mines over his in allocating cars for loading. That experience apparently got him interested in the railroad, which had been drifting unattached since its bankruptcy in 1917. In 1923 he, his brother, and some Cleveland friends bought control, largely as an adjunct to their coal interests but possibly also with an eye to its potential value in the railroad consolidation scramble. 152 • Invisible Giants In relation to the railroads around it, Taplin’s P&WV was a pea-sized property, only eighty-nine miles in total, and was weak on several counts. As one of George Gould’s last major projects before his march east was stopped, it never had the chance to develop as Gould intended. As it existed in the mid1920s , it was essentially a dead-end branch of the Wheeling & Lake Erie and was dependent on that railroad for its western outlet. On its east end, it had no friendly connection whatever ; instead, it stared at that 40-mile missing link in Gould’s planned route to the eastern seaboard via the Western Maryland at Connellsville. Furthermore, it was excluded from much of Pittsburgh’s industry and depended on on-line coal mines, such as Taplin’s, for most of its sustenance. As Loree and Williams began stirring in 1926, Taplin saw opportunity. Thinking that he might be able to unload his Gould orphan at a goodly profit, he first approached the New York Central’s Pat Crowley in March of that year. His price turned out to be $200 a share for stock then valued at about $70–$90 (and which the Taplin group had bought for about $52). Crowley hardly needed the P&WV as a Central adjunct —it already controlled the infinitely superior Pittsburgh & Lake Erie—and the price seemed far above its strategic value. He quickly declined, and later in the year Taplin went to General Atterbury. The reaction was essentially the same, but the door was left ajar and the two reportedly parted on friendly terms. (There is no evidence, however, that Atterbury later aided Taplin, as he did Loree.)1 So spurned, Taplin then decided to move on his own. By then it was clear that a combination of the Pittsburgh & West Virginia and the Wheeling & Lake Erie would be an important pawn in the escalating consolidation warfare—and in any event, the P&WV’s future was inseparably tied to the Wheeling . At the same time that the Central, the B&O, and the Van Sweringens went after the Wheeling, he decided to do so too. Held at bay by the Rockefellers, who preferred to deal with the “triple alliance,” Taplin went boldly into the open market and by the end of January 1927 had spent over $5 million for W&LE stock. At the same time, the “triple alliance” had made its commitment to the Rockefellers, and the Van Sweringens were buying additional Wheeling stock in the market. The Vans achieved their purpose, managing to pick up the stock at between $50 and $53 a share before the end of January. But the combination of the sudden purchases by Van Sweringen and Taplin produced a spectacular aftereffect. Speculators who had sold short, expecting the price to drop, suddenly Frank Taplin’s cherubic smile usually reflected some triumph over an adversary, not beneficence . Cleveland Press Collection, Cleveland State University [3.230.76.153] Project MUSE (2024-03-28 21:19 GMT) The Street Fighter • 153 found there was no stock to be had. In the space of three days, the price shot from $83 to $130 a share. Working with the Morgan bank, the three allies relieved the pressure by releasing a limited amount of stock, and the crisis passed.2 By then, of course, the Vans and their two...