In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

10 A Pragmatist Case for Animal Advocates on Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees Todd M. Lekan In our times, scientists who use animals for research and advocates who work for animal welfare organizations seem to live in separate moral worlds. Scientists might think that things should remain this way, but over the long run such a strategy will probably only exacerbate extremist elements on both sides of the debate over whether, and when, animals ought to be used in experiments. I believe it is time to consider the good reasons for creating more opportunity for regular dialogue between animal advocates and researchers by including advocates on the committees that review animal experiments at institutions. At this time, in the United States, no legal requirement exists for animal advocates to sit on institutional animal care and use committees (IACUCs)—the committees charged with evaluating research proposals involving animals.1 Inclusion of animal advocates on IACUCs does occur, but relatively rarely. By drawing on some conceptual resources from the pragmatist tradition,2 I think we can ®esh out a framework for justifying the claim that their inclusion ought to be a matter of course. Pragmatists have long argued that thriving democratic societies require robust communication between experts and the interested lay public for the purpose of resolving common problems. Pragmatists have also developed a nuanced account of inquiry as a social practice with emotional, political, and cultural dimensions that are as important to take account of as more narrowly “cognitive” matters. Such an approach promises rich insights into questions regarding proper oversight of morally problematic scienti¤c research. My argument presupposes a middle-ground position between absolute permissibility of animal use and complete abolition. Seeking such a middle ground re®ects another feature of pragmatist philosophy: the use of philosophical conceptual resources to help resolve what Dewey calls the “problems of men”(what we might call the “problems of sentient beings”). I believe that many research scientists hold some kind of middle-ground view. Therefore, my argument that inclusion of animal advocates follows from some such middle-ground view is offered in part because this conclusion is a doable improvement of our current protocol evaluation practices, which, ultimately, should bene¤t research ani- mals. I do not, in this essay, specify the precise quali¤cations of an IACUC animal advocate, let alone what it takes to be an “advocate.”I assume that advocates will be dedicated to animal welfare and will usually be members of animal welfare organizations. I certainly do not claim that anyone who calls him- or herself an advocate will be a suitable member of an IACUC, nor do I claim that people who do not consider themselves advocates, including research scientists, are incapable of strong moral concern for the well-being of animals used in experiments . My primary goal is to explore the philosophical rationale for a strong commitment to robust moral deliberation on IACUCs that entails the inclusion of an animal advocate on such committees. Setting out that philosophical context is a necessary ¤rst step, but much more needs to be done. Thus, my proposal is only a moral minimum—offered as a modest ¤rst step in improving our research practices involving animals. I concede that my proposal may well be too modest. We do not always have the luxury of easily separating a solution that is a realistic temporary compromise from one that is a betrayal of a moral ideal. Since philosophic pragmatism views moral ideals as deliberative aims that regulate our judgments about how to improve our practices, it may not be surprising that my proposal is tentative and in need of further work. What is a bit surprising is that John Dewey, one of the most prominent of all pragmatists, takes a fairly strident position against more oversight of scienti¤c research using animals. Since my contradiction of a founding pragmatist in the name of pragmatism might seem odd, it will be useful to pause for a brief consideration of Dewey’s views. These views, I think, turn out to be a function less of Dewey’s pragmatist commitments than of a somewhat narrow view of the potential moral con®ict in animal research. Dewey’s Dismissal of Animal Advocates: Anti-Pragmatist Dogmatism? In The Public and Its Problems, Dewey wrote: “Knowledge cooped up in a private consciousness is a myth, and knowledge of social phenomena is peculiarly dependent upon dissemination, for only by distribution can such knowledge be either obtained or tested...

Share