Perfectionism and Contemporary Feminist Values

3. An Introduction to Perfectionism

3 An Introduction to Perfectionism In contrast to liberalism’s focus on social rights and fair conditions, perfectionism focuses directly on how people should live. Perfectionism, broadly de¤ned, is a theory of the good life. According to Thomas Hurka, perfectionist theory “starts from an account of the good human life, or the intrinsically desirable life. . . . Certain properties, it says, constitute human nature or are de¤nitive of humanity—they make humans humans. The good life, it then says, develops these properties to a high degree or realizes what is central to human nature.”1 Perfectionist theories divide into those arguing that certain activities and traits are inherently valuable—valuable in light of human nature—and those arguing that certain activities and traits are intrinsically valuable—valuable regardless of human nature. Vinit Haksar describes these views as weak and strong perfectionism. According to Haksar, weak perfectionism asserts that some forms of human life are superior to others because they “are more suited to human beings.” In contrast, strong perfectionism says there are x’s and y’s such that “whatever human nature turns out to be . . . it would still be the case that x would be superior to y.”2 Perfectionist theories provide a distinct alternative to the seemingly neutral procedural arguments that dominate feminist debates about women’s choices. Rather than discussing whether choices were made under free or constrained choice conditions, perfectionist theories focus on what choices mean in themselves or what they mean in relation to human nature. Perfectionist theories abandon liberalism’s neutrality toward ends by adopting substantive conceptions of human ®ourishing. Perfectionist theorists then criticize choices based on the degree to which the choices promote such human®ourishing. Perfectionist theories are both moral and political. They describe what the good life looks like for the individual, and they encourage social policies and structures that promote individual ®ourishing. In this chapter I present what seem to me to be the four most complete and thorough contemporary perfectionist theories. I present these theories in order to suggest perfectionism’s potential to articulate a more honest basis for feminists’ criticism of women’s choices. I also show how the current perfectionist theories fail to live up to this potential. In section I, I present the perfectionisms of Joseph Raz, Thomas Hurka, and George Sher. While these theories are derived from different starting points, they are all too abstract to be useful in guiding people’s lives. In section II, I present the perfectionism of Martha Nussbaum. While Nussbaum provides more speci¤c requirements for human ®ourishing, her focus on the need for primary goods, which individuals living in industrialized societies already possess (or at least possess an agreed-upon social right to), renders her theory not very useful for women in these countries. I. Abstract Perfectionisms Joseph Raz puts forth a two-stage perfectionist theory. The ¤rst stage asserts the intrinsic value of autonomy and an autonomous life. The second stage modi¤es and narrows this perfectionism by stating that a good life is not simply one in which an individual is autonomous but one in which an individual autonomously chooses only “valuable” life choices. Unfortunately, Raz does not describe the criteria that render choices valuable and gives little guidance as to which choices these are. Raz begins The Morality of Freedom by stating that his book “denies the revisionist approach and af¤rms the intrinsic value of liberty.”3 By this, Raz means that he denies that autonomy is valuable only instrumentally as a means to realizing other truly valuable ends such as justice, equality, or identi ¤ed social rights.4 Raz argues that autonomy is valuable in itself.5 While Raz does not explain why autonomy is intrinsically valuable, he does describe the conditions necessary for its existence. According to Raz, autonomy requires that an individual possess the mental abilities necessary to form intentions, develop complex plans, and connect means with their probable ends.6 The individual must not only possess these cognitive rational capacities but must also have the physical capacities to exercise them meaningfully in constructing her day-to-day life. In order to be able to meaningfully exercise these physical and mental abilities, she needs to also have available an adequate range of plausible options to choose among, free from external coercion and manipulation.7 Autonomous choices are those made under such conditions. Raz’s perfectionism, however, does not simply require that individuals live autonomously but that they direct their lives toward valuable...