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5 The Root, That Is Necessarily One, of Every Dilemma: An Investigation of the Introduction to Husserl’s “The Origin of Geometry” In Le Problème de la genèse, Derrida asks the question that leads Husserl in “The Origin of Geometry” to a consideration of language: “How do we pass from an absolutely originary pre-predicative individual state . . . to the existence of a geometrical being in its ideal objectivity”(PGH 267)? In the earlier Le Problème de la genèse, however, Derrida pursues neither the question nor Husserl’s answer to it. This happens in his 1962 Introduction to Husserl’s “The Origin of Geometry.” The Introduction to Husserl’s “The Origin of Geometry” transforms the problem of genesis into the problem of the sign.1 We are entering into what we might call Derrida’s “linguistic turn.” Only here, when Derrida pursues Husserl’s answer to the question of the generation of ideal objects through language, does he discover that writing is an irreducible condition for sense and perception. Nevertheless, although a condition for knowledge, writing is not an intuition and cannot be determined by intuition. Through the Introduction’s analysis of writing therefore, Derrida is able “to approach something like the un-thought-out axiomatics of Husserlian phenomenology, its ‘principle of all principles,’ that is to say, its intuitionism. . . . ”2 But, more importantly, beyond the critique of phenomenology, the Introduction establishes an absolute unity—a “one”—in which all oppositions necessarily contaminate each other; the Introduction, therefore, sets up, as Derrida says in his 1966 essay “Freud and the Scene of Writing,” “the originary concepts of ‘différance’ and ‘delay ’.”3 The absolute unity, which Derrida in the Introduction calls “passage,” leads to the “dif¤culties” that Derrida locates in Husserl’s “The Origin of Geometry.”Again, the reading of Husserl in terms of contradictions, dif¤culties , and problems ultimately for Derrida means that deconstruction is concerned to lead us to an experience. But here in the Introduction this aim is not yet clear. The reason why the Introduction exhibits a labyrinthine structure is due to Derrida’s cataloging of these dif¤culties. As in Le Probl ème de la genèse, here in the Introduction, the dif¤culties require that phenomenology be completed with ontology. As in Le Problème de la genèse, Derrida here calls the absolute unity an “originary dialectic.” But, unlike Le Problème de la genèse, the Introduction de¤nes this dialectic in terms of “the originary difference of the absolute origin” (LOG 171/153). Derrida nearly has conceived différance because at this time he has a more profound understanding of Hegel. This more profound understanding of Hegel is due to Derrida’s interaction with Jean Hyppolite. There are three reasons why Hyppolite’s Logic and Existence is important for Derrida at this stage in his development.4 First, Hyppolite stresses the irreducible role that language plays in Hegel ’s dialectical genesis; consequently, Derrida investigates the role of language in Husserl. As we shall see, Hyppolite’s consideration of language in Hegel opens up the question of memory in Derrida (which is one of his enduring concerns). Second, Hyppolite brings to light how Hegel’s philosophy transforms metaphysics into logic; Hegel’s philosophy, for Hyppolite , completes immanence without eliminating difference.5 Consequently, Derrida seeks this difference in immanence in Husserl. As we shall see, this difference opens up for Derrida a new logic of totality (that he continuously employs in his writings).Third,Hyppolite conceives Hegel’s philosophy in an anti-humanistic way; there is a transcendence of humanity in Hegel. Consequently, Derrida seeks in Husserl an anti-humanity in humanity , and the humanism of Le Problème de la genèse vanishes. Hyppolite, however, de¤nes Hegel’s thought so that philosophers such as Derrida (and Deleuze and Foucault) seek ways to escape from Hegelianism .6 First, although Hyppolite clari¤es the relation between thought and being as “essential difference,” he stresses that essential difference must, for Hegel, be conceived in terms of contradiction. Eventually, Derrida will conceive difference without contradiction.Second,although Hyppolite de-¤nes mediation as language, he conceives language as “living speech.” Conceived as voice, language is equivalent to intellectual intuition. For Hegel, language is bound to knowledge. Hegel’s thought, for Hyppolite therefore, is, as Derrida will say later, a logocentrism. And eventually, Derrida will depart from knowledge toward a notion of faith. Third, although The Root, That Is Necessarily One, of Every...

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