Ethnographies of the State in Central Asia: Performing Politics

10. The Reshaping of Cities and Citizens in Uzbekistan: The Case of Namangan’s “New Uzbeks”

243 10.TheReshapingofCities andCitizensinUzbekistan The Case of Namangan’s “New Uzbeks” Tommaso Trevisani Two decades after Uzbekistan’s independence, this chapter focuses on the emergence of the “New Uzbeks ,” a governmentally promoted citizenry that marks a shift from the early, unsettled period of postsocialism to a more consolidated phase of government rule over society in the second postsocialist decade. Situated in between the elites and the poor, the New Uzbeks refer to those segments of society who have come to terms with and found a place in President Karimov’s Uzbekistan . Rather than a coherent and cohesive social entity, they should be seen as the ambivalent outcome of an ongoing political project whose impact on the urban landscape of Uzbekistan has so far received little attention. In this context, I discuss a government policy in which the reshaping of cities and the propagation of a new model of (non-liberal) citizenship form part of a state project of hegemony. Presented as necessary steps upon the “Uzbek path to development” by government officials, these policies seem to be readily welcomed by a significant part of Uzbek society. The reality, however, is more complex and must take shifting areas and mechanisms of coping into consideration . I argue that in order to adequately frame this emerging phenomenon it is necessary to shift from the modernization framework underlying official state discourse on national development to the realm and language of legitimacy. While keeping a focus on the ambiguities of the New Uzbeks’ attitudes toward the state, I want to problematize the relationship between the rulers and the ruled in independent Uzbekistan that so far has been mostly conceptualized in terms of power discrepancies, fear, and coercion.1 I suggest that this relation- 244 Tommaso Trevisani ship has been portrayed in too simplistic a way, and that coercion and compliance , coping and consent all play a role therein to different degrees.2 Methodologically, a hitherto little attempted ethnography of consent in Uzbek authoritarianism poses problems at various levels, not least one of access. Fieldwork conditions in Uzbekistan are restrictive, which limits possibilities for conducting ethnographic research in depth.3 Moreover, as Matveeva rightly notes: “in authoritarian states it is difficult both for outsiders and insiders to interpret the extent to which citizens identify with the political order” (Matveeva 2009, 1096). Yet these difficulties should not translate into avoidance or neglect of how citizens relate to the political order, as this is essential for understanding state-society relations in present-day Uzbekistan (Jones Luong 2004). Consequently, by adopting Megoran’s plea to use ethnography to gain more insights into the everyday “politicization of national belonging in independent Uzbekistan” (Megoran 2008, 28), I pay attention to local discourses justifying the state and the rulers’ modus operandi toward society. In these discourses ambiguity and ambivalence emerge as distinctive qualities, contradicting simple models opposing support to resistance that see compliance as mere submission to coercion. Post-Soviet Namangan My particular vantage point is the city of Namangan and its surroundings, in the Uzbek part of the Fergana Valley. Namangan is a symbolically resonant place since, in the first decade of independence and following prolonged turmoil and anti-government protests, it came to epitomize the confrontation between the post-Soviet government and Islam. Its region-wide notoriety is rooted in the early 1990s Adolat movement (adolat means “justice” in Uzbek), a militant Islamic group established in Namangan ostensibly to fight corruption and speculation, uphold public order, and to promote Islamic mores. Karimov’s rancorous relationship with Namangan goes back to the personal humiliation he experienced in that city during winter of 1991–1992, at a time when Adolat effectively held power over the city and exerted growing influence over the whole Fergana Valley. Under the pressure of the “street,” that is of mass rallies organized by Adolat followers, Karimov was pulled into a public meeting with the leaders of the movement, where he was treated disrespectfully and requested to turn Uzbekistan into an Islamic state (Khalid 2007, 140– 141). Although Karimov eventually overcame this crisis and was able to reassert control over the city in the months that followed, on that occasion he felt vulnerable and personally threatened to a degree he had not experienced before or since. A watershed moment for him, this experience strengthened his con- The Reshaping of Cities and Citizens in Uzbekistan 245 victions and decisively influenced his future policy toward Islam and toward...