Plato's Cratylus: The Comedy of Language

6. A Homeric Inheritance

98 6 A Homeric Inheritance In the foregoing chapter we saw that the technological view of language—that view initially held by Hermogenes and traced back, by Socrates, to the sophist Protagoras—has shown itself to be nothing other than the tragic view of language . It could not be more appropriate, then, that Socrates now turns to the tragic poet Homer.1 In his treatment of Homer, Socrates will offer a series of etymologies involving the most famous tragic family of Ancient Greece, the House of Atreus. Through the development of these etymologies, and the etymologies of certain gods’ names, Socrates will further show the disruption of inheritance that was previously foreshadowed. What will be seen above all is the manner in which the Homeric clue to the correctness of names calls the very possibility of inheritance into question, thereby further disrupting the natural relationship between names and beings, as well as between the human and the divine. Proceeding with the inquiry, Socrates reiterates that he does not himself say that there is a correctness of names, but is happy to investigate (σκεψοίμην) along with Hermogenes (391a). He then summarizes the findings of the inquiry so far, stating that “names hold [ἔχον] a certain correctness by nature [φύσει], and not everyone knows how to set [θέσθαι] the names beautifully” (391a; my translation). Socrates then says that their present task is to attempt to discover what sort (ἥτις) of correctness belongs to names, if Hermogenes desires (ἐπιθυμεῖς) to know about it (391b), to which Hermogenes replies decisively, “of course I desire [ἐπιθυμῶ] to know” (391b; my translation). In indicating that he desires to be moved upward toward the knowledge of the correctness of names, Hermogenes exhibits his erotic comportment toward the matter at hand, thereby displaying a certain kinship with the erotic and vertically oriented Hermes. Whether and to what extent Hermogenes will continue to demonstrate such kinship, thereby proving himself to indeed be the son of Hermes (and thus proving himself to be correctly named), remains to be seen. Socrates then offers Hermogenes an imperative: “Investigate” (σκόπει) (391b), to which Hermogenes responds inquisitively, “How is it necessary to investigate [σκοπεῖν]?” Socrates then says that the most correct (ὀρθοτάτη) way to investigate A Homeric Inheritance | 99 (σκέψεως) would be to enlist the help of those who know about such things: namely, “the sophists [οἱ σοφισταί]—and it is by paying them a lot of money that your brother Callias seems to be wise [σοφὸς δοκεῖ εἶναι]” (391b–c; Sachs). Socrates then offers the following: “But since you are not in control [οὐκ ἐγκρατὴς] of your inheritance [τῶν πατρῴων],2 you need to plead your case with your brother and beg him to teach you what he learned from Protagoras about the correctness [τὴν ὀρθότητα] involved in such matters” (391c; Sachs; trans. modified). The repetition of the word σκοπεῖν, used five times in fifteen lines, should be viewed in light of the previous play between σκοπεῖν and σκώπτειν (384c), and thus understood as emphasizing the comedy of Socrates’ suggestion: for given that he and Socrates have just now decisively rejected the doctrine of Protagoras, it would be palpably ridiculous if Hermogenes now begged his brother Callias to teach him that very doctrine. Hermogenes affirms the ridiculousness by saying that such a course of action would be absurd (ἄτοπος) (391c).3 Beforeproceeding,itmustbenotedthatHermogenes’inheritance(πατρῷος)— or, more specifically, his lack of inheritance—has now been thematically brought to the fore. This mention of Hermogenes’ lack of inheritance explicitly names what is about to become a predominant theme within the text: the question of inheritance and the manner in which this question bears upon the correctness of names. In commenting upon Hermogenes’ lack of inheritance Socrates has suggested that Hermogenes does not have in his possession what is proper to his­ father: in other words, that he is not like his father, that he lacks the properties, or the proper being, of his father. The question of the dissimilarity between father and son—which, we will soon see, is nothing other than a question of monstrosity —will soon be made an explicit theme within the text. After having listened to Hermogenes’ rather forceful rejection of Socrates’ suggestion that he beg his brother Callias to teach him the knowledge concerning the correctness of names (391c), Socrates, not without some irony, suggests that Hermogenes look instead to Homer (391d). Claiming that such knowledge is to be found in those passages in which Homer deals with the differences between human and divine names, Socrates offers the following important query: “Do you not think that he says [λέγειν] in those passages great and wonderful words [θαυμάσιον] about...