In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

160 18. ASAD’S LOST CHANCES CARSTEN WIELAND On January 31, 2011 the Wall Street Journal printed words that Bashar al-Asad must have winced to recall. In an interview with the newspaper, the Syrian president said that Arab rulers would need to move faster to accommodate the rising political and economic aspirations of Arab peoples.“If you didn’t see the need for reform before what happened in Egypt and Tunisia, it’s too late to do any reform,” he chided his fellow leaders. But Asad went on to assure the interviewer (and perhaps himself): “Syria is stable. Why? Because you have to be very closely linked to the beliefs of the people. This is the core issue. When there is divergence…you will have this vacuum that creates disturbances.” Not even two months later,confrontations between protesters and security forces across Syria shook the Baathist regime harder than any challenge since the 1980s.No matter what the course of the upheavals, the Syria that many knew for decades will never be the same. The protests tore asunder the delicate fabric of rules, explicit and implicit, that for decades determined the relations between the regime and the citizenry. By Syrian standards, the political concessions promised by regime representatives to quiet the early months of unrest were far-reaching; long years of civil society activism were unable to achieve them. By the yardstick of the times,however,the moves were inadequate.Following a presidential speech to Parliament on March 30, it looked like sweeping reform was an empty promise. And a rising number of Syrians did not swallow their disappointment.The pervasive fear for which this police state is infamous gave way to unpredictable bursts of popular anger, as well as hope for a better future. President Asad, for his part, likely feels twinges of nostalgia for the days when Syria’s main source of dissent was a group of intellectuals of the Civil Society Movement, most of them elderly, who for ten years had called for political pluralism and civil rights. He may miss the occasions on which he was presented with elaborate declarations,lists of signatures and critical articles appearing in the Lebanese press but meant for Syrian consumption. Many of the authors shared the Baathists’pan-Arab orientation and hardline stance toward Israel; they could have been secular partners to build bridges to Islamist and other more radical forces. Just after the US invasion of Iraq, in May 2003, many observers pricked up their ears in surprise when a central regime figure commended the Syrian opposition for its prudence. Bahjat Sulayman, the powerful former head of Syrian intelligence, wrote in the Lebanese 161 SYRIA | ASAD’S LOST CHANCES newspaper al-Safir, “In Syria, the regime does not have enemies but ‘opponents’ whose demands do not go beyond certain political and economic reforms such as the end of the state of emergency and martial law; the adoption of a law on political parties; and the equitable redistribution of national wealth.”1 Forcible regime change, Sulayman knew, was only on the agenda of select exiles and US politicians. But President Asad treated the Civil Society Movement intellectuals, with their debating clubs and talk of a soft landing for Syria’s transition away from authoritarianism, like a gang of criminals. By March 2011, the days were long gone when obstreperousness was defined as discussion in the back rooms of teahouses suffused with the aromatic smoke of water pipes. Now the Syrian president faces tumult in the streets and the whiff of gunpowder. Patterns of Unrest Information about the demonstrations and clashes has been scarce since the beginning of the uprising. Much of the country outside of Damascus has been a no-go zone for journalists , with most forms of communication cut. Reporting from anywhere in Syria has been scanty throughout the crisis. Yet the outlines of a minimum outcome quickly emerged: Power relations will be renegotiated. Inside the regime, key posts were reshuffled amidst rumors of open discord between Bashar al-Asad and the security services, between Asad and the army, between Bashar and other members of the Asad clan and, possibly, between ‘Alawis, Sunnis and members of other sects in the upper echelons.The regime will have less leeway in its social, economic and political decisions going forward; that have been (until his assassination in July 2012). But the current round is far from over, in any case, and its maximum outcome is regime change. For years, Asad quelled...

Share