The Imjin and Kapyong Battles, Korea, 1951

3 IMJIN: THE THIRD DAY

75 Imjin: TheThirdDay As dawn crept in from the east on Tuesday morning, the most pressing problem along the brigade front was unquestionably the precarious position of the Glosters. Forced to abandon successive company hill positions, cut off for more than fifteen hours, losing comrades one after another, and running low on supplies, the surviving Glosters could not hold out forever against Chinese attacks. The commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel J. P. Carne, had already decided that his battered and dwindling battalion would have to concentrate on a single feature, so as soon as there was enough daylight he ordered B Company to cross the valley and join the other companies onHill235.Theordercamenonetoosoon,sincetheisolatedBCompany was almost at the end of its rope. The men on Hill 314 under Major Denis Harding had endured more than half-a-dozen assaults by heavily armed Chinese. “Lofty” Large of 6 Platoonrecalledhowatonepointamidstburstingmortarshellsheheard an officer cry, “Stand fast the Glosters–remember the Back Badge!” a reference to the fore-and-aft cap badges of the Glosters commemorating their back-to-back action at the Battle of the Nile in 1801. Immediately an anonymous squaddie replied, “Fuck the Back Badge–I want out!” a remark much appreciated by others at the sharp end. “I was amazed to find myself laughing,” Large related, “and heard the laughter of others through the clatter and roar of the battle.” The pressure, however, was unrelenting.Largealsorememberedhowtheothermaninhisslittrench reacted some time later as they repelled yet another assault, when he, Large, was hit and blood sprayed everywhere: three 76 The Imjin and Kapyong Battles, Korea, 1951 The other man looked around, relief on his blood-specked face, as he realized we had survived another rush. Then he saw the blood and said, “I’m hit.” [sic] He stared in disbelief for a few seconds, then crawled into a poncho for a few seconds, and just shook. A few minutes later [Second-]Lieutenant [Arthur] Peal came over with more ammo, saw I was hit and asked where the other chap was. I looked at the poncho. How he knew I’ll never know in that place of dead and half dead. He called the man’s name, pulled back the bolt of his Sten gun, and said, “You have three seconds to get out of there–one!” The man came out like a startled rabbit, stared at Mr Peal, then at me for a few seconds. Mr Peal said, “You OK now?” The man nodded and resumed his firing position, then carried on as normal as if nothing had happened . . . The man was, his trench companion added, “a damn good soldier too.” Nevertheless time was running out for those on Hill 314.3 The breaking point occurred in the sector occupied by 4 Platoon. As the B Company commander, Major Denis Harding, later reported: By now the situation was very serious. Ammunition was virtually expended and many wounded were lying in the company area with little or no cover to protect them. After withdrawing for reorganization, a short pause ensued and the seventh and final [Chinese] attack was launched at 08.10 hours. Hordes of Chinese rushed up to the summit of the hill and charged through 4 Platoon’s area. Sheer weight of numbers forced the platoon over the rear face of the hill . . . “I lost six men and nearly everyone was wounded” noted the platoon commander, Lieutenant Geoffrey Costello, who did not escape injury either: “I was hit twice in the leg and once in the head.”4 It was pretty much a case of every man for himself as the company disintegrated. Many of the enemy troops in the valley, intent on moving southtowardthemainfront,simplyignoredthesmallpartiesofGlosters making their way toward what would become known as Gloster Hill: “They weren’t taking any notice of us at all,” remembered Nick Carter. There were, however, also Chinese soldiers whose job it was to mop up enemy stragglers, and despite covering fire from Gloster Hill some men wereeitherkilledorcapturedbeforetheycouldfindaclearroute,including Peal. Only some fifteen to twenty men, including Major Harding, were able to reach Hill 235.5 EvenbeforeHill314waslost,Carnewascontemplatingthepossibility of leading an attempt to strike southward with what remained of his fighting strength. Indeed he had broached the subject the previous day with the D Company commander. “Mike, we will probably soon have to break-out down the Solma-ri road south,” the CO had explained, “in Imjin: The Third Day 77 whichcaseDCompany[CCompanyhavingbeenconsiderednotstrong...