Prelude to Blitzkrieg: The 1916 Austro-German Campaign in Romania

2. The Central Powers Respond

32 Teschen and Pless, 29 August 1916 The Romanian invasion proved too much for the kaiser, who sacked von Falkenhayn, replacing him with Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg (1847–1934)andLieutenantGeneralErichLudendorff(1865–1937).After taking over the headquarters of the German High Command at Pless in Silesia on 29 August 1916, Hindenburg sent Ludendorff to the Austrian army headquarters at nearby Teschen to discuss the situation with the Austrian chief of staff, General Conrad von Hötzendorf. Ludendorff discovered that von Falkenhayn had been at Teschen the day before, going over the crisis with Conrad, reviewing the plans they had made in July. Both chiefs had decided that Arz would have to hold on as best he could in Transylvania until reinforcements arrived. Meanwhile,alongtheBulgarianbordervonMackensen’ssmallGermanBulgarianforcewouldstageafeint ,threateningBucharest–whichwould slow or even stop the Romanian advance in Hungary. Allegedly the two left the decision of where to attack, toward Bucharest or the Dobrogea, with von Mackensen.1 Ludendorff had already decided that the first priority of the new OHL was to establish its authority by regaining the initiative on the Eastern Front, so he was not adverse to taking bold action. Conrad wanted to minimize losses in Transylvania by having von Mackensen cross the Danube and advance at once on Bucharest. Ludendorff instead convinced him that von Mackensen’s army was too weak to head for the enemy capital. Ludendorff argued that if the marshal marched east into the Dobrogea region, the Central Powers could accomplish the same goal–namely, forcing the Romanians to withdraw The Central Powers Respond 2 The Central Powers Respond 33 troopsfromTransylvaniatostophim,whichwouldbuytimefortheOHL and AOK to send forces to that beleaguered area.2 Reluctantly, Conrad agreed, and von Mackensen received orders to head into the Dobrogea. At the moment, however, stopping the Romanians in Transylvania had top priority, and with the Austrian 1st Army already in the region, it was given that mission. Conrad and Ludendorff agreed to assemble a second armytopursuetheRomaniansbackovertheTransylvanianAlpstoward Bucharest. The Germans indicated they would provide the army headquarters for this mission.3 LudendorffreturnedtoPless,andheandvonHindenburgconvinced the kaiser to take the momentous step of ending the Verdun offensive, ultimately freeing units that could be sent elsewhere. The Central Powers had simply run out of divisions. Every army commander clamored for more, but the advance of the Romanians into Transylvania threatened to turn the entire flank of the Eastern Front, so halting them came first. Von Hindenburg did not exaggerate when he said that the Central Powers found themselves nearly defenseless against this latest enemy.4 Romania’s entry into the war threatened to rupture the Southeast Front and bring down the house of cards that comprised the Central Powers. “If the Romanians’ advance were not stopped,” wrote Ludendorff, “the way into the heart of Hungary and our lines of communication with the Balkan Peninsula would be [open]. That would mean our defeat.”5 Closing his eyes to the dangers on the other fronts, Ludendorff started moving German divisions and headquarters to Transylvania. He later admitted that his ignorance of the circumstances in the west permitted this step; had he known the complete picture there, he would never have mustered the courage.6 First came orders moving several divisions, then two corps headquartersreceivedthewordtodepartfortheRomaniantheater .Thesearch for an army headquarters to send to Transylvania took a week longer. Part of the reason for the delay was the absence of both von Hindenburg and Ludendorff from the OHL. The two had left Pless on 5 September for a quick visit to the Western Front, returning four days later. While traveling,Ludendorffdiscoveredthathehadonlyonearmyheadquarters available–theoneinSlominthathadbeenunderthecommandof Prince LeopoldofBavaria(1846–1930).Theprincehadjustleft,takingvonHin- 34 Prelude to Blitzkrieg denburg’splaceascommanderinchiefintheeast.On6thSeptember,the kaiser had renamed Army Group Prince Leopold the 9th German Army and assigned von Falkenhayn to command it, apparently without checking with von Hindenburg or Ludendorff.7 Following his dismissal in August , von Falkenhayn had asked to be assigned to the front, securing a perfunctory nod of agreement from the kaiser. The former chief of staff had expected to be retired in ignominy, but to his surprise, Wilhelm II lived up to his word and notified von Falkenhayn of the appointment on the 6th. The 9th Army headquarters was ordered to move to Grodno, in northeast Poland. Sending that headquarters to Romania posed a problem. The new team at the OHL and von Falkenhayn were enemies. For two years von Hindenburg and Ludendorff had undermined von Falkenhayn’s authority at...