Prelude to Blitzkrieg: The 1916 Austro-German Campaign in Romania

Preface

xi Although every war has its iconic imagery, none matches the grim horror of the Western Front during World War I. Materialschlacht was the German term for the carnage, a word as brutal sounding as its portrayal of industrial-scale slaughter. Trenches, barbed wire, poisongas ,artillerybarrages,andmachinegunsmowingdownmud-soaked millionsformedthelandscapeoftheWesternFront.Cappingthepicture are aristocratic officers living in luxury far from danger, indifferently sending soldiers to their deaths just to capture a few feet of ground. This familiar picture of stalemated armies, however, depicts the war in the west, where by late 1914 trenches ran in solid lines from the SwissGerman -French border junction to the English Channel in Belgium. In the east, the picture was quite different. There were trenches, to be sure, but the vast area meant that these took the form of local fortifications. Maneuvering, from the first clash in 1914 to the last blows in 1917, was a normal feature of battle. Fighting often took the form that prewar theorists had envisioned: bold, rapid movements of infantry turning enemy flanks, with cavalry conducting reconnaissance or providing a screen of cover for advancing infantry. Infantry remained the queen of the battle by virtue of its mobility, which translated into speed–a speed that allowed a determined attacker to outflank or penetrate enemy positions before reserves could be brought to bear. Infantry that outran its artillery support quickly perished, a development that required the gunners to match the pace of the infantry. Even cavalry remained useful in the east, where the open spaces allowed the exploitation of a breakthrough and the rapid pursuit of a retreating foe. Speed was the elixir of success. Preface xii Preface In Transylvania and Romania in 1916, the nature of combat bore a greater resemblance to the opening moves of World War II–a decisive period of rapid movement and battles, called the blitzkrieg by the Allies –than it does to the stereotype of World War I, with trenches and deadlock. Hitting where least expected and advancing without the fixation on protecting exposed flanks so endemic in the west, the German 9th Army defeated two Romanian armies inside Transylvania, poured over the formidable Carpathian Mountains onto the plains of Walachia, rolled up the entire Romanian army from west to east, and drove the shattered remnants against Russia within four months. The rate of advance of the 9th Army in Transylvania in September or across Walachia in November–December 1916 compares favorably with the heady days (for the Germans) of the blitzkrieg in 1939–1940. Of course, blitzkrieg is not a term associated with World War I. Ironically, the 9th Army was led by General Erich von Falkenhayn, sacked as chief of staff of the Prussian army on the eve of the campaign inAugust1916owingtotheperceptionthathisstrategyofattritioninthe west and failure to pursue a decisive victory in the east had created a debacle . Given the opportunity in Romania to salvage his reputation, von Falkenhayn grasped the imperative for speed. Winter came early in the Carpathian Mountains, and unless he drove the Romanians back and securedthepassesthroughthemountainsbeforeweathershutdownoperations , the Romanians would remain on Austro-Hungarian territory until well into 1917. Von Falkenhayn had few troops at his disposal and, at least initially, his forces would be outnumbered. Getting reinforcements from the other theaters of the war would take weeks. In addition, theprojectedtheaterofoperationsinRomaniasatattheedgeoftheleast developed and most remote region of Austria-Hungary, Transylvania, compounding the logistical problems of mounting a campaign. Against all odds, von Falkenhayn succeeded brilliantly, proving himself to be a master of operational warfare as his soldiers smashed through the Carpathian Mountains and raced across Walachia. The chimera of open warfare that so tantalized the leaders on the WesternFrontwasthenormintheeast,raisingthequestion,whichfront was the true face of war: the stalemate in the west or the vast battles of open warfare characteristic of the Eastern Front? For the man who had Preface xiii the task of rebuilding the shattered German army after the war, General Hans von Seeckt, operations in the eastern theater provided the answer and illustrated the nature of future combat. Following his participation in the Marne Campaign of 1914, von Seeckt served exclusively for the rest of the war in the east. In May 1915, as chief of staff in August von Mackensen’s 11th Army, he directed the impressive breakthrough at Gorlice-Tarnow. For the next six weeks the 11th Army rolled across the foothills of the Beskiden and Northern CarpathianMountains ,forcingtheRussianstoevacuateGaliciaandeventuallyPoland .Overaquarter-millionRussianswerecaptured.Inthefallof thatyear,againasvonMackensen’schiefofstaff,butthistimeatthelevel...