Prelude to Blitzkrieg: The 1916 Austro-German Campaign in Romania

7. Moldavia: The Forgotten Front

211 The Eastern Carpathians InearlySeptembertheRussiansattackedtheAustrian7thArmyandthe German South Army north of Transylvania, in the Austrian province called the Bucovina. The South Army had been set up by the Germans a year before to stiffen the Austrians. It was a joint army, with more Austrian than German divisions. Both of these Central Power armies came under the control of Army Front Archduke Karl.1 Fortunately for the Central Powers, the Russians neither weighted their offensive nor coordinated it with the Romanian invasion of Transylvania in late August. Instead, the Russians waited ten days after the Romanians attacked before beginning to move. They also diffused their strength by striking at three locations. At the end of the first week in September, they attacked at the Kirlibaba Pass, the key to the vital Borsa highway approach to the Maramures region of what was then northeastern Hungary, and on the left flank of the 7th Army at the Tatar Pass, farther north in Galicia. In addition, west of the 7th Army, the Russians pressed the South Army, which defended the passes leading into northern Hungary. Initially, matters were so critical that von Hindenburg had to divert the first three divisions he had intended to send to Transylvania, transferring them to Archduke Karl’s area of operations. The reinforcements didnotresolvethecrisis:boththe7thandtheSouthArmieswerepushed back. Conrad likewise sent two divisions from his 3rd Army, which momentarily stemmed the tide.2 After a pause in mid-September, on the 20th the Russians struck far to the south, attacking the Golden Bistrita Moldavia: The Forgotten Front 7 212 Prelude to Blitzkrieg Valleysouthwestof VatraDornei,threateningthelinkbetweentheAustrian 7th and 1st Armies.3 Had the Russians begun this latest advance threeweeksearlierincoordinationwiththeRomanianoffensiveintothe areaatthenorthernbendoftheMuresRiver,theymighthavereapeddecisiveresults .ThenorthernMuresregionwasthenvirtuallyundefended, and a combined Russian-Romanian offensive would have broken the contact between the two Austrian armies, opening the northern Carpathian passes to the Russians. The inexperienced Romanians instead proceeded slowly and hesitantly, which–combined with the inactivity of the Russians in this area–gave the Austrian and German High Commands enough time to rush reinforcements into the region.4 The Russian blows against the South and 7th Armies in September represented the last throes of the great Brusilov Offensive that had started in June. The Russians were not a factor in the mid-October GermanAustrian rush to the passes in the Carpathian Mountains within Transylvania . An intelligence report from the 7th Army confirmed that the Russians were exhausted, had suffered large losses, and had no reserves. They showed no signs that they were preparing for another large offensive . Instead, the Russian units worked on improving their positions.5 Freed from that worry, the 1st Army pursued the retreating Romanians across Siebenbürgen, albeit without much vigor. As von Falkenhayn ’s forces closed on Brasov, he urged Arz to keep up pressure on the northern front. The Austrian general ordered his divisions to pursue with more energy. Von Falkenhayn was still not pleased, chiding Arz for beinginsufficiently aggressiveand dilutinghisstrength byfollowingthe enemy along every little path. He wrote Arz, telling him to consolidate his forces into an attack group (Stossgruppe) and move into Harghita (Csik) County. He asked Arz how he planned to do this, but Arz did not respond. Nonetheless, the Austrian general ordered the VI Army Corps to march toward Harghita County. When the 9th Army emerged from the Geisterwald into the Brasov Basin on 6 October, von Falkenhayn triumphantly announced that the “beaten enemy is in complete retreat,” but Arz did not take this hint to speed up his pursuit. The Austrian’s methodical pace infuriated von Falkenhayn. He sent his counterpart a memorandum containing lengthy citations from the Austrian AOK that urged unhesitating and relentless pursuit of the retreating Romanians. Moldavia 213 Von Falkenhayn sarcastically asked if this concept was still alive in the 1st Army. Arz shrugged off the rude note.6 The Austrian High Command stepped in on the 8th, providing further intelligence that the enemy had begun withdrawing all along the Transylvanian Front: the Romanians’ 2nd Army was heading south toward Ploesti, and their North Army was marching east toward Piatra. Both armies, the AOK believed, were likely to halt at the border in the mountain passes. The staff at Teschen expected that the Russians would soon help the Romanian North Army, and they anticipated that the Romanian general headquarters would send reinforcements to Averescu’s beleaguered 2nd Army. Regardless, none of this changed the mission for the 1st and 9th Armies, which was...