Africa after Apartheid: South Africa, Race, and Nation in Tanzania

Notes

Notes Preface 1. The original Arabic usage of this term refers to “nonbelievers” or “heathens.” 2. The general problem of how to relate to occasionally unsympathetic research subjects is one that is featured in a special issue of the journal Geoforum: “Behind Enemy Lines: Reflections on the Practice and Production of Oppositional Research” (Thiem and Robertson 2010). On the particular topic of ethical challenges facing white researchers who study different forms of white racism in Africa, see Steyn (2001), Hughes (2010), and Hammar (2010). Introduction 1. Nyerere was a teacher before entering politics. 2. For a selection of newspaper articles in this vein, see Okema (2005a); Kihaule (2005); Kenge (2005); Jozeni (2005); wa Kuhenga (2006b); Fox (2003); and Ulimwengu (2010). See also a series of personal memoirs and scholarly analyses devoted to the exploration of Nyerere’s moral legacy: Legum and Mmari (1995); Smyth and Seftel (1998); McDonald and Sahle (2002); Mwakikagile (2006); Askew (2006); Bjerk (2008); and Chachage and Cassam (2010). For an explicit discussion of how selective such memories often are, see Ulimwengu (2009). 3. Confino (1997, 1388); Olick and Robbins (1998, 110). For a vivid illustration of this point, see Ranger’s discussion of the emergence of what he calls “patriotic history” in contemporary Zimbabwe (Ranger 2004, 218–20). 4. Cohen applies this concept to a case study of Slovakia. She notes that the primary object of a given regime’s attempt to promote “organized forgetting” is to “destroy [the] link to an alternative world and alternative standards for judgment” (Cohen 1999, 39). In the case of Tanzania, this would apply to the legacy of Nyerere and the political norms and principles embodied in his socialist government policies. 5. Pitcher (2006, 89); see also Pitcher (2002). 6. Olick and Robbins (1998, 126–28); cf. Askew (2006); Pred (2004). 7. See the full discussion in Pitcher (2006, 88–89, 94–98). 8. See Adedeji (1996); Daniel, Naidoo, and Naidu (2003); SARPN (2004); Daniel, Lutchman, and Naidu (2005); Adebajo et al. (2007); and Miller, Oloyede, and Saunders (2008). 166 Notes to Pages 5–6 9. This concept was originally developed as a central tenet of the pan-Africanist vision of Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah. 10. As one critic jokingly put it, “They should call it ‘KNEE-PAD.’ Get on your knees and we might throw you some crumbs” (quoted in Orakwue 2002). For favorable analyses of NEPAD, see Games (2004) and Grobbelaar (2004); for more critical perspectives , see Bond (2002); Miller (2003); Lesufi (2004); Alden and Soko (2005); and Samson (2009). Miller, Oloyede, and Saunders (2008) provide a comprehensive summary of the related debate. 11. Shivji (2006b, 169–77). Marx identified the wealth extracted through the process of “primitive accumulation” as a precursor to the development of capitalism (Marx 1976, 873–942). The latest wave of investments by South Africa and other international actors has also been likened to a “new scramble for Africa” (Southall and Melber 2009; Carmody 2011). This term derives from the late nineteenth-century “scramble” by European powers to lay claim to parts of the continent that had not yet been colonized. 12. Bond (2004); cf. Miller, Oloyede, and Saunders (2008); Samson (2009). 13. Ahwireng-Obeng and McGowan (1998); Lesufi (2004); Alden and Soko (2005); cf. Adedeji (1996); Daniel et al. (2005). 14. Apart from the South African case, the best example of this phenomenon in Africa is China. Historically, China has occupied a privileged position within Africa’s “moral geography” by virtue of having actively supported the southern African liberation movements (Bailey 1975; cf. Smith 2000). When newly independent landlocked Zambia struggled to find an outlet for its copper resources that would not flow through the white-controlled territories of Angola or Rhodesia, for example, the Chinese stepped in to help construct the so-called Freedom Railway linking Zambian copper fields to Tanzanian ports on the Indian Ocean (Monson 2009; see further discussion in chapter 1). The China of the 2000s is a very different sort of political and economic actor than the China of the 1970s, however (Brautigam 2009). Whereas the original forms of Chinese assistance were at least nominally tied to development goals and the cause of national liberation, China recently adopted a much more aggressive posture toward Africa . Its support for unsavory political regimes in the Sudan and Zimbabwe signaled its primary interest in the extraction of minerals and energy resources and the expansion of markets for Chinese goods (Power and Mohan 2008). Like the South Africans, the new Chinese investors...