In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

3 The Principles of Psychology Consciousness as a Constitutive Stream The Principles of Psychology (PP), James’s first major work, was twelve years in the making and earned for him the title “father of American psychology.” Initially, James adopted a “functional dualism” for this text, separating the domain of psychology from other domains, such as metaphysics: “Every natural science assumes certain data critically. . . . Psychology, the science of finite individual minds, assumes as its data (1) thoughts and feelings, and (2) a physical world with which they coexist and which (3) they know. Of course these data are discussible; but the discussion of them (as of other elements) is called metaphysics and falls outside the province of this book.”1 And again, “This book consequently rejects both the associational and the spiritualist theories; and in this strictly positivistic point of view consists the only feature of it for which I feel tempted to claim originality” (PP, 1: 6). This, then, is the “manifest image” presented by James to the reader. Also part of the manifest image is his radically new view of consciousness as a stream rather than an object or a substance. The latent content of his position becomes manifest when he realizes that the dualism he espouses cannot be maintained and that psychology leaks into metaphysics itself. This chapter focuses primarily on an analysis of the “stream of consciousness” and to the realization that its characteristics, as outlined by James, entail its undoing as a neutrally functioning object. James identifies five characteristics of consciousness. The fact that he utilized only four characteristics when writing the shorter version of PP would seem to indicate that these divisions were overlapping rather than mutually exclusive. One way of grouping the divisions of the stream might be to say that the first, fourth, 18 William James in Focus and fifth characteristics emphasize intensity or zest, while the second and third remind us that intensity is cumulative or that richness is a cocriterion. It is this division that we shall adopt here. According to James, 1. Every thought tends to be a part of a personal consciousness; 2. It [consciousness] always appears to deal with objects other than itself; that is, it is cognitive, or possesses the function of knowing; 3. It is interested in some parts of these objects to the exclusion of others, and welcomes or rejects—chooses among them. . . . all the while. (PP, 1: 220) In calling all thoughts “personal,” James immediately stresses involvement on the part of each of us. There are no impartial thoughts existing as transcendental spectators, impartially viewing the game of life. Every thought is “owned” or, better, “tends to appear” as owned, thus leaving space for the “facts of subconscious personality” or “secondary personal selves” (PP, 1: 222). James is here advocating the efficacy of consciousness. The reason is simple: consciousness must have a role to play if life is to be intense—a “real fight.” Consciousness must be personally involved if we are to get from life that sense of zest that James was always seeking. At this stage, however, the only way James sees to uphold the active power of consciousness is to adopt a dualism. Indeed, there are several places in PP where he explicitly adopts a dualistic approach. For example, The psychologist’s attitude toward cognition . . . is a thorough going dualism. It supposes two elements, mind knowing and thing known, and treats them as irreducible. Neither gets out of itself or into the other, neither in any way is the other, neither makes the other. (ibid., 1: 214) The problem confronting James is clear: What approach to life will allow for the personal efficacy of consciousness and, hence, the intensity of experience? A dualistic approach would satisfy this demand but at the cost of bifurcating experience. By separating experience into two parts, dualism impoverishes the original richness of experience. While James himself is unclear here and continually rejects and then returns to dualism in PP, there are at least some signs of the discomfort he felt in adopting dualism. This is most readily seen in the analysis of the fourth and fifth characteristics of consciousness. Consciousness, as cognitive, appears to deal with, or “intends,” an object. Conception is defined by James as “neither the mental state nor what the mental state signifies, but the relation between the two, namely, the function of the mental state in signifying just that particular thing” (PP, 1: 436). Consciousness as portrayed [3.12.162.179] Project...

Share