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4 Before Phenomenology To adore the Lord God is not to shy away from humanity, a humanity that is unique and united, a humanity toward which eternal thought leans [se penche] and to which it pours out its heart [s’épanche]. —Emmanuel Levinas, Difficult Freedom . . . and since it is true that study, even when done properly, can only teach us what wisdom, right conduct and determination consist in, they wanted to put their children directly in touch with actual cases, teaching them not by hearsay but by actively assaying them, vigorously molding and forming them not merely by word and precept but chiefly by deeds and examples, so that wisdom should not be something which the soul knows but the soul’s very essence and temperament, not something acquired but a natural property. —Michel de Montaigne, “On schoolmasters’ learning” “How does one become the kind of ethical subject Levinas describes?” This question typically emerges in response to discussions about Levinas’s ethical project. In other words, the discussion frequently shifts from the description of the ethical subject to the question of origin: Is Levinas simply describing an ethical subjectivity that already exists or is he describing a subjectivity that is “not yet”? Implicit in these questions is an underlying concern that there is a normative dimension to this ethical subject. And of course, one response to this type of question is simply to say that it is the wrong question to ask. Levinas is describing a subjectivity that we already are and that we have simply covered over. On the one hand, Levinas refers to ethical obligation as anarchic—without a fundamental or grounding principle. On the other hand, responses to Levinas’s project include statements like, “I just do not feel compelled by the Other,” or “I am not persuaded by his phenomenology.” How is one to respond to these comments? If Levinas’s project simply describes ethical obligation phenomenologically , indicating that his aim is not to establish ethical obligation in the first place, but to demonstrate that this obligation is already present, then how do we respond to an opposing claim that appears to undermine this description? What does it mean to ask after the warrant for Levinas’s ethical responsibility? If Levinas claims simply to describe the ethical obligation for the Other, then Before Phenomenology 81 the warrant for ethics is not required. Yet, these questions nonetheless persist. Even if Levinas is simply describing the ethical relationship, an obligation to the Other that is present even if we do not experience it as such, we are pulled into a discussion that asks how this relationship toward the Other arises. The frequent questions posed in response to Levinas’s ethical project reflect an underlying theme that is rarely articulated: How does one become an ethical subject in the sense that Levinas defines subjectivity? This is to say, is it learned? Is it innate? I do not mean to pose the questions so simplistically, but the question of how one becomes an ethical subject is not addressed in the many discussions of his ethical project and yet the question lingers. In other words, simply offering a phenomenological description of the ethical relationship does not explain its origin.1 Since the claim not to experience the obligation as described is a frequent objection to Levinas’s ethics, simply stating that the obligation is always already there might not persuade those who raise the doubts in the first place. Additionally, this particular puzzle speaks to a more controversial question: “What is the ground of this ethical obligation?” This question, I argue, is for Levinas intimately related to the origin of the ethical subject. I recognize that if one readily accepts the phenomenological account, the question about “ground” becomes meaningless—indeed, it may even become a violation of the very discussion . I also realize that by framing the question in this way I imply that Levinas is conjuring up an ethical ideal and foisting that ideal on us—what gives him the right to do this? Those who are skeptical of my approach might be inclined to say: it is one thing that Levinas describes ethical subjectivity as such; it is quite another if his version of ethical subjectivity requires development. As I mentioned above, the common response to a discussion of Levinas’s ethics is typically, “But I don’t feel compelled by the Other. I am not aware of any claim.” These responses indicate that on the one hand our...

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