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192 The brown cement Martyrs Monument to the Four Battles of Siping stands quietly in a small park in the middle of a traffic roundabout west oftherailwaystation.Childrenplayhappilynearby,unawareofwhatever the monument might mean. Old folks play there too, endless games of cards and xiangqi on tables in the shade of the trees. Even in the summer of 2010, some of them remember those bitter times when the city was torn by war, but they are reluctant to talk about them. Why ruin a perfectly nice afternoon and a fine game of Chinese chess with unhappy memories? A few minutes’ walk away in Martyrs Park, the Memorial Hall of the Four Battles of Siping struggles to keep the memory of the events of 1946 alive and to give them significance in a world that seems to have changed beyond recognition. The Memorial Hall, opened in 2007, and the monument, which dates back to the 1950s, are both attempts to capture the memory of the past and to preserve it in concrete, steel, inscriptions , and (in the case of the Memorial Hall) displays of artifacts and illustrations. But despite the best attempts of the architect and the museumdesigner ,memorycannotbecapturedandpreserved.Themeaning of eventschangesfrom generationtogeneration,from decadeto decade, even, at times, from year to year. Incidents buried deep in the past and seemingly forgotten may be brought to life again and given new significance in a new context. 8 Visions of the Past and Future Figure 8.1. Siping Martyrs Monument. Photograph by the author. 18.116.42.208] Project MUSE (2024-04-19 22:25 GMT) 194 The Battle for Manchuria and the Fate of China So it has been with the battle which took place at Siping in April– May 1946. In Taiwan, where it is called the Battle of Siping, and in the United States, where it has no name, the Second Battle of Siping has been represented as a turning point—a chance for complete victory that Chiang Kai-shek failed to seize, and which consequently became a moment of opportunity for Mao Zedong, Lin Biao, and the Northeast Democratic United Army. Remembered in China as the Battle to Defend Siping, it has been seen both as a victory and as a defeat, a strategic turning point and a strategic error. The competing interpretations of the Second Battle of Siping all carry with them different lessons from the past and different visions of the future. All of them are not only based on the events that took place at Siping itself; the events of that time and place are also interpreted in the context of what happened next—the Northeast Democratic Army’s recovery of strength, its counterattack against and then destruction of the Nationalist forces in Manchuria, andtheCommunistParty’sultimatedefeatofChiangKai-shek.Inorder Figure 8.2. Battle of Siping Memorial Hall. Photograph by the author. Visions of the Past and Future 195 to understand the shifting and competing significances of the Second Battle of Siping, we too must look, if only briefly, at what happened after Lin Biao retreated to Harbin and Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists signed on to Marshall’s June ceasefire agreement. The Tipping Point: June 1946–March 1947 On23May,theCommunist NortheastDailyreportedthelossofSipingas a voluntary withdrawal after a month-long victorious defense.1 Lin Biao and the leaders of the Northeast Bureau knew better. On 16 June 1946, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party gave them the following stern directive: The current situation in the Northeast is grave. In order to unify leadership, it is decided that Lin Biao will serve as Secretary of the Northeast Bureau and concurrently as Commander-in-Chief and Political Commissar of the Northeast United Democratic Army. The four comrades Peng Zhen, Luo Ronghuan, Gao Gang and Chen Yun will serve concurrently as vice-secretaries and vice-political commissars. The Standing Committee of the Northeast Bureau will consist of five men: Lin, Peng, Luo and Chen. The Center believes that under the current conditions, this division of labor is not only necessary but also feasible; the Center is confident that said comrades will be able to act in concert with one another, unite around the new division of labor, work to overcome difficulties and strive for victory.2 This decision was a clear repudiation of Peng Zhen’s leadership of the Northeast Bureau. For over nine months, Peng Zhen had wrestled with the challenges on the ground in Manchuria, with the shifting strategies coming out of Yan’an, and with increasingly...

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