McClellan's War: The Failure of Moderation in the Struggle for the Union

10. The Peninsula Campaign

198 chapter ten The Peninsula Campaign On March 17, 1862, the ¤rst units of the Army of the Potomac began boarding ships bound for Fort Monroe. If what he had seen and experienced during the previous eight months in Washington had con¤rmed his distaste for politics, now that McClellan was with his army and con¤dent that things with Lincoln were, despite all the tensions of the past few weeks, “all right,” he began to exude con¤dence. “Rely upon it,” he advised Stanton on March 18, “that I will carry this thing through handsomely.”1 Exactly how the general planned to “carry this thing through” was a matter of some concern to Stanton, who had accepted, although he did not agree with, the plan to operate from the Peninsula. He did, however, make a point of insisting that McClellan lay out his speci¤c intentions in writing. Although relations between McClellan and Stanton had been severely strained by recent events, the former was, as the campaign started, “anxious for the good opinion of everyone ,” according to John Hay. So, on March 19, McClellan sent a lengthy letter to Stanton laying out his initial plan of operations.2 “The proposed plan of operation,” McClellan proclaimed, “is to assume Fort Monroe as the ¤rst base of operations . . . Richmond being the objective point.” With the James River closed as a line of operations due to the presence of the CSS Virginia, he made reaching West Point on the York River and establishing a depot there the focus of his initial planning. In order to reach West Point, however, the Confederate garrison at Yorktown would ¤rst have to be dealt with. This, McClellan pointed out, could be accomplished by either an overland march up the Peninsula from Fort Monroe leading to a siege of the town or—and this was his clear preference—by a direct joint “naval and land attack.” With the cooperation of the navy, he anticipated such an operation the peninsula campaign 199 would “not . . . require many hours.” After Yorktown fell, he would then send a “strong corps . . . up the York under cover of the Navy directly upon West Point.” Once that place had been secured, he assumed the rebels would concentrate their forces between West Point and Richmond and make the ¤ght for the capital there. But should he have an opportunity to take advantage of it, however, McClellan took care to point out that from West Point he would have George B. McClellan Courtesy Princeton University Firestone Library. 200 mcclellan’s war another promising option for operating on Richmond: “developing and bringing into play the whole of our available force on either or both banks of the James.”3 McClellan devoted much of his letter to impressing upon the government how critical assistance from the navy was to the implementation of his bold, yet carefully reasoned, plan to quickly overcome the Confederate defenses on the Lower Peninsula. Without full cooperation from the navy, he warned Stanton, “operations may be prolonged for many weeks and we may be forced to carry in front several strong positions which by their aid could be turned without serious loss of either time or men.” He sent a message to Stanton on March 20 asking if he had seen “my letter in regard to co-operation of Navy. . . . I have now to choose at once between the two methods of accomplishing our object.” That same day, McClellan learned from McDowell that the attendees at a meeting at the executive mansion had approved his plan, but that “the ability of the Navy to do their part” was still an open question. There the matter remained until McClellan reached the Peninsula.4 Stanton expressed no objections to McClellan’s plan and the general spent the last week of March supervising his army’s march to Alexandria, from where it would depart for Fort Monroe. He also worked on his plan for the defense of Washington. During the March 13 meeting of the corps commanders at Fairfax Court House, the question of how many men would be required to secure Washington while the Army of the Potomac was on the Peninsula had been discussed. McDowell, Heintzelman, and Keyes agreed that 25,000 men plus full garrisons in the defenses of Washington would be enough; Sumner thought “a total of 40,000 men . . . would suf¤ce.” This was acceptable to McClellan and he forwarded...