In Passage Perilous: Malta and the Convoy Battles of June 1942

7. The Battle of Pantelleria

7 The baTTle of panTelleria It was an exciting month for my young warriors who drained to the bottom the intoxicating cup of success. Division Admiral Alberto Da Zara At 0620 the eastern sky was beginning to brighten. A light northwest breeze rippled the surface of the sea. Force X bore twenty-five miles southwest of Pantelleria, steaming toward Malta at a steady twelve knots. The merchant ships sailed in two columns with Cairo leading. The destroyers screened the formation—the 11th Flotilla with Bedouin (Commander B. G. Scurfield), Partridge, Ithuriel, Marne, and Matchless was to starboard, while the 12th Flotilla ’s Blankney (Lieutenant Commander P. F. Powlett), Badsworth, Middle­ ton, and Kujawiak sailed to port. The minesweepers Speedy (Lieutenant Commander A. E. Doran), Hythe, Hebe, Rye, and the six motor launches brought up the rear. At 0620 Cairo received a radio report that at 0600 a Beaufighter, one of five that had departed Malta before dawn to cover Force X, had spotted two enemy cruisers and four destroyers fifteen miles off the convoy’s port beam. Cairo had fighter direction facilities, but they did not work in this instance as the pilot reported to Malta and Malta forwarded the information to Hardy, thus delaying the British captain’s receipt of this vital news. The Italian formation, led by the 10th Destroyer Squadron, followed by the cruisers and the 14th Squadron, had Pantelleria abeam to starboard and was steaming due south at twenty-four knots. An hour before, it had deployed from night cruising to battle formation, expecting to confront the enemy at first light. But just to be sure the cruisers each launched an RO.43 floatplane 143 144 In Passage Perilous at 0620. As the planes soared off their catapults it seemed a perfect launch. However, a Beaufighter splashed Eugenio’s aircraft at 0710 while Montecuccoli’s damaged its radio on takeoff and, although it faithfully followed the convoy, it could not report. On both fleets binoculars studied the horizon. At 0627 Matchless reported two cruisers and three destroyers fifteen miles to the northeast. At 0630 Cairo confirmed, and at the same time Oriani, leading the Italian formation, signaled smoke and the uncertain shape of many ships on the darker western horizon. Admiral Da Zara was pleased to make contact but considered the odds unfavorable . He estimated that the enemy had three cruisers and eight destroyers including, perhaps, the heavy cruiser Supermarina had warned about that night. The Italian admiral immediately rang up twenty-eight knots. A north– south mine barrage, 7 AN, ran ten miles east of his position. This barrage, which dated from 11 June 1940, consisted of 393 P 200 mines; because of an unusually strong current running the night they were laid, many mines had activated their hydrostatic anchors prematurely. This resulted in the mines lying too close to the surface. Over the years storm effects had caused many to break free and drift, and the Regia Marina considered the area west of the field hazardous because it was subject to these floating menaces. At 0638 Da Zara increased speed to thirty-two knots. Because of the barrage that prevented him from maneuvering east, he decided to pull ahead of the convoy and attack it from the south, driving the enemy across the mines. At the same time the 14th Squadron’s Captain Castrogiovanni came on the highfrequency voice radio to report that Malocello’s best speed was twenty-eight knots and his squadron was dropping behind. Da Zara radioed back instructing Castrogiovanni to attack the convoy independently. The destroyer captain turned his two ships to a west-by-northwest heading shortly thereafter while the rest of the Italian force pressed south. Upon being confronted by the enemy Captain Hardy later reported that he immediately ordered Bedouin to act independently while he held the Hunts and Cairo back to make smoke. “My immediate intention was to gain time and to fight a delaying action in the hope that an air striking force could be sent from Malta.” Apparently he was unaware that Malta’s air assets were already committed to attacking Admiral Iachino’s fleet threatening the Vigorous convoy . Only four FAA Albacores and two Beauforts with crews even more inexperienced than those already committed were available, and it would be four hours before this scant force would answer Hardy’s call.1 The Battle of Pantelleria 145 Open Fire At 0639...