Kierkegaard and Death

4. Suicide and Despair

suicide and despair 81 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 4. Suicide and Despair Marius Timmann Mjaaland There is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide. —Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus The Sickness unto Death. Already the title indicates a deep affliction with the problem of suicide, although the book is presented as a treatise on the modern self in despair. Suicide is not mentioned until a later stage of the analysis, when Kierkegaard suddenly breaks into a short discussion of how suicide influences despair. Then he admits, albeit in brackets, that this is what the entire investigation is about—in a “more profound” sense. The question of suicide thus seems unavoidable for any reading of The Sickness unto Death, but its significance has, so far, hardly been acknowledged or properly analyzed. In remedying this lack, I see here a chance to approach the entire problem of self and despair once more, from different angles including sociological, cultural, and psychological, as well as theological and philosophical. From a theoretical perspective, the problem of suicide raises basic questions concerning religion and the very meaning of existence. It thereby affects the individual on a personal level and is frequently an issue for psychology, philosophy, and literature. However, it is also a sociological and cultural problem, as shown by Émile Durkheim in his famous study Le suicide (1897). In The Sickness unto Death, published by Kierkegaard in 1849 under the pseudonym Anti-Climacus, the individual and the sociological aspects seem to be closely intertwined.1 Suicide is, after all, a troubling symptom of cultural, spiritual, and psychological sickness, a sickness unto death in the most literal sense. 82 marius timmann mjaaland Self, Spirit, Suicide According to the initial definition offered in Sickness, “A human being is spirit” (SUD, 13/SKS 11, 129). Spirit is then further defined as the self, and the self is in turn defined as a self-reflexive relationship, a “relation’s relating itself to itself.” A person who does not relate to him- or herself is not yet a self. He or she is thus “spiritless,” i.e., unconscious of being a self in the sense of spirit. Such ignorance of being a self, Kierkegaard claims, is the most common form of despair (SUD, 45/SKS 11, 161). Despair proper does, however, presuppose a certain consciousness of being a self and thus consciously relating to oneself. The basic structure of conscious despair is double or twofold: in despair not willing to be oneself, and in despair willing to be oneself. This double origin of the sickness unto death makes it necessary to analyze it dialectically.2 Kierkegaard’s definition of spirit deliberately relates to the Christian tradition. Hence he points out that his criteria for what despair is, and for defining someone as being in despair, cannot be given by aesthetic standards or by so-called pagan standards, such as nation, state, or culture (SUD, 46/SKS 11, 161). He insists on the Christian definition of despair as the only valid definition—although it is applied universally, regardless of religious commitment. The definition appears to be what we would now call “inclusivistic.” Hence even the pagan, the atheist, or anyone else who would presumably be ignorant of being in despair falls under this definition .3 Ignorance is no excuse. And the principal difference between the spirit and the spiritless, Kierkegaard claims, becomes visible in their differing judgments on suicide: That is why the pagan (to cite this as an example, although it touches this whole investigation in a much more profound way) judged suicide with such singular irresponsibility, yes, praised suicide, which for spirit is the most crucial sin, escaping from existence in this way, mutinying against God. The pagan lacked the spirit’s definition of a self, and therefore it judged suicide [S e l v mord: self-murder] in that way; and the same pagan who judged suicide in that way passed severe moral judgment on stealing , unchastity, etc. He lacked the point of view for suicide, he lacked the God-relationship and the self; in purely pagan thinking, suicide is the indifferent [det Indifferente], something entirely up to the pleasure of each individual, since it is no one else’s business (SUD, 46/SKS 11, 161...