A Genealogy of Marion's Philosophy of Religion: Apparent Darkness

Conclusion

Conclusion The aim of this study has been to ask how resilient the tensions in Marion ’s thought are under the lens of his fascinatingly rich, yet uneasy retrieval of the Greek apophatic tradition. I argued that, despite abundant evidence of the sophistication and comprehensiveness of his knowledge of patristic writings, the Fathers too often function homogeneously as a source of authoritative “orthodoxy” in Marion’s thought. I challenged the univocity of his reading of Gregory of Nyssa and Dionysius in particular , arguing that distinct theories of apophasis emerge out of their different ontologies. I then demonstrated the way divergent motivations in Marion’s thought were highlighted through an analysis of his use of Dionysius and Gregory. On the one hand, his complicated retrieval of Dionysius drew attention to the finally irreconcilable tension within his methodological enterprise. On the other hand, Gregory proved to be a tapped, though (as yet) underutilized, resource for clarifying the paradoxical relation of pure givenness and its subsequently infinite interpretation. Throughout these arguments, I have challenged certain aspects of the scholarship on all three of the main figures of this study: Marion, Gregory of Nyssa, and Dionysius. First, I intentionally read outside the parameters of the most dominant debate on Marion: the perennial argument regarding his theological versus his phenomenological identity. I have argued that an overzealous preoccupation with this debate actually glosses over a more integral tension within his thought between a universal methodology that seeks to secure phenomenology’s place as first philosophy and the anti-idolatry orientation of Marion’s enterprise that attempts to free all phenomena from any constraint. Secondly, I challenged a long-standing trend in the comparative scholarship on Gregory and Dionysius that elides the apophatic visions of the two and that has, until recently, tended to ignore the original and distinct contributions Gregory makes to notions of Christian 156 . A Genealogy of Marion’s Philosophy of Religion apophaticism. In so doing, I am certainly not arguing that Gregory offers a more “radical” or “better” apophaticism than Dionysius (a bizarre claim to make). I am simply insisting on the significant difference between the two. Attention to the difference is not merely a historical issue . It is also significant when one wants to make use of the patristic arguments within contemporary debates. It remains only to reflect in closing on some of the unresolved issues of this study as well as its broader implications regarding the apologetic value of Marion’s thought. Let me first identify issues that invite further exploration than this study has offered. Two related lacunae, in particular , trouble Marion’s phenomenological project: a lack of attention to the role of preparatory practices in developing a capacity to receive phenomena as pure givens, and the absence of comment on how, or even whether, we might judge the relative benevolence or malevolence of the phenomena that have such a powerful impact upon us. One might imagine many practices that cultivate expectancy or receptivity : bodily and contemplative practices as well as social and individual practices. There are a multitude of examples from within the history of Christianity: silent prayer; the contemplation of icons; the practice of solitude, of living in a community, of training one’s temporal experience around the liturgical seasons; restrictions on sexual practices and diet; rules about clothing, obedience, poverty, and so on. Marion does refer to one form of practice, Eucharistic contemplation and participation in the liturgy. Yet he never theorizes on the effect of these activities precisely as a practice, or what Hadot would call a “spiritual exercise,” that might help to clear away obstacles to the reception of given phenomena and thus enlarge our receptive capacity. A debate could occur about which of these practices are more or less conducive to the “clearing away of obstacles” in order that saturated phenomena might appear as they give themselves freely and without constraint. However, Marion never raises the question. Marion’s inattention to preparatory practices might be explained by his wariness to open a place of personal agency for the subject who, as the “gifted” (l’adonné), has the sole purpose of receiving an unbidden gift. Nonetheless, this very wariness, along with Marion’s inclination to attribute a kind of “agency” or selfhood to the phenomena that give themselves, gives rise to the second lacuna in Marion’s thought: How are we to judge the intentionality (for good or ill) of the saturated phenomenon and its consequent effect on the one to whom it is...