Guard Wars: The 28th Infantry Division in World War II

4. Peacetime Maneuvers: 1939–1941

54 4 Peacetime Maneuvers 1939–1941 Startingin1935,NationalGuardunitsgatheredwiththeirRegularArmycounterparts during the summer to conduct large-scale maneuvers.1 The Pennsylvania National Guard participated in four such exercises: once in 1939 and in 1940, and twice in 1941. The manner in which the NG participated revealed an institution full of esprit de corps and commitment to military service, but short on war-fighting skills. Regular Army formations also participated, and the maneuvers demonstrated that neither institution was ready for war. Fiscal starvation and anti-interventionism had emasculated both in regard to their ability to fight. They were, however, in better condition than they had been in previous years. In 1926, for example, the Army consisted of “paper divisions.” Althoughauthorized19,997men,“peacetime”divisionsnumbered9,200.They retained the basic “square” organization from the Great War: two brigades, each containing two rifle regiments.2 Individual armories geared up for the exercises in a variety of ways on their own initiative. In May 1939 the 110th Infantry, for instance, practiced airto -ground communications with the 103rd Observation Squadron employing visualsignalsandvoiceradioattheDuncansvilleairport.3 Itdemonstratedthe PNG’spovertywhenitdroppedbagsofflour,simulatingbombs,onmembersof the 112th Infantry.4 Regimental, brigade, and division commanders scrambled to design and script the war games, because First Army failed to provide the 28th Division with planning orders until June 1. For that reason PNG officers had to take off time from their civilian jobs to travel to Manassas and scout the area, paying for the trip themselves. While the German Army readied its invasion of Poland, the PNG spent two weeks in August 1939 on maneuvers as part of Third Corps, First Army, at Peacetime Maneuvers | 55 ManassasNationalBattlefieldPark,Virginia.MajorGeneralMiltonReckord’s 29th Division, consisting predominantly of Marylanders, with a leavening of Virginians and men from the District of Columbia, also made the trip.5 A provisional division of Army Regulars rounded out the participants and served as the adversary force for the exercise. Altogether 17,000 enlisted men and 2,200 officers—including 707 Reserve officers—participated.6 The maneuvers’ purpose was originally to provide battle practice for large units, and to evaluate the divisions’ mobilization, transportation, supply, and organizationalproficiency.Commanderschangedtheirgoalstotraining,troop instruction,andleadershipdevelopmentbecausetheirsoldiersweresodeficient in basic skills. Soft-pedaling the issue of his men’s performance, the III Corps commander,MajorGeneralJamesK.Parsons,didnotwriteacritiqueofthemaneuvers , assuming that the men could recognize and correct their mistakes.7 Just getting to Manassas was a learning experience. Convoys required 1,700 vehicles, and the rest of the soldiers arrived in 136 railroad cars.8 Once they arrived, the two NG divisions busied themselves with exercises from the battalion to division during August 6–12.9 Guardsmen always arrived at field training out of shape and unprepared for the physical demands, so the leadershipsetasidetimeforexerciseandphysicaltraining .10 Theidealwasforthemto arrive having completed basic and small-unit training, but that was impossible given the circumstances of the interwar NG. Military attachés from twelve countries, including Germany and Japan, watched the maneuvers with keen if bemused interest. They joined Governor James, the chair of the House Military Affairs Committee, the chief of the National Guard Bureau, the acting chief of staff, General Marshall, and a press corps of seventy-four reporters representing thirty-eight newspapers and wire services.11 First Army’s commander, Major General Hugh A. Drum, took advantage of the abundance of press microphones to appeal to the public for help by noting the shortage of soldiers and weapons. He pointed out, for instance, an 83 percent shortage of a basic artillery weapon, the 155mm cannon for the Regular Army, as well as a 77 percent shortage in Regular soldiers.12 The Manassas maneuvers exposed weaknesses and shortages and helped to form the War Department’s training, equipping, and military mobilization goals for the next two years. Their climax, a battle between the two NG divisions in III Corps and the Regular Army Provisional Division, took place from August 13 to 17. The mock combat between the two forces was “free”; movements were not scripted. Commanders, not exercise evaluators, directed troop movements.13 56 | Guard Wars The war game tasked III Corps with the job of protecting Washington, D.C., from an attack by the “Black Force,” the Provisional Division.14 There were plenty of artificialities: raised flags signified artillery fire, since no one used live or even blank ammunition. The scenario was contrived as a teaching tool, not as a reflection of security threats, and aircraft were almost completely absent. It all required...