Guard Wars: The 28th Infantry Division in World War II

2. Relations with the Army and State Identity

9 2 Relations with the Army and State Identity American national defense efforts in the late 1930s were hesitant and reluctant. They centered on the defense of North America; only a minority of Americans sought intervention in the crises in Europe and Asia. Feelings of contempt for theOldWorldintheaftermathoftheFirstWorldWarcombinedwiththecrisis of the Great Depression resulted in an inward focus within the United States. Preferring to rely on the protection of two oceans and the United States Navy, the country had not maintained a well-equipped or well-trained army, and the National Guard was not prepared to contribute to the defense of the country in a timely manner. Indeed, the Pennsylvania National Guard remained in a number of ways an institution even more local in its character and outlook than the general mood of the country. In the opinion of some in the Army, the local character of the National Guard was an impediment to the accomplishment of one of its foundational tasks: developing the basic skills of soldiering. The requirements for an enlarged Army, the desire for maintaining the local distinctiveness of the Pennsylvania National Guard, coupled with the Guard’s need for Regular Army expertise, generated conflict between the two institutions. National Guard leaders worried that a loss of a distinct National Guard identity would be a consequence of the Army’s plans for expansion and greater readiness. Interestingly, the reaction of Pennsylvania guardsmen to the erosion of their local and state identity by their interaction with the Army was relatively mild, and illustrated that by the mid-twentieth century, localism was an emotional affinity of its officers, a preference—not a deeply held political conviction. Long-service PNG officers commingled local pride and identity with an appreciationfortheArmy ’sknowledgeofthecraftofmodernwarfareinamanner that would over time yield to the national Army’s consolidating impulse. 10 | Guard Wars Local Pride Pennsylvania National Guard officers valued the local character of their units andthestatedistinctivenessoftheformationsinthePNG,buttheyfearedthat giventhechance,theArmywouldbreakupanddisperseguardsmenamongthe homogenized Army out of pure spite. The guardsmen also considered themselves to be the personification of the citizen-soldier ideal: the citizen who remains true to his civilian values, yet performs well in combat. Peacetime maneuvers and post-mobilization training from 1939 to 1941, however, proved this to be far from true. The guardsmen often lacked basic war-fighting skills and were eager for instruction from professional soldiers out of a desire to overcome that deficiency. The men of the United States’ eighteen National Guard divisions received that training from the Regular Army following the mobilization of the National Guard in 1940 and 1941. Concurrently the Army slowly assimilated the 28th Infantry Division and the other divisions into itself during 1942–1943, resulting in the divisions’ loss of state identity. The ease of this assimilation resulted from the fact that members of the National Guard had already internalized the values of rationalization, centralization, and standardization that characterized American life during the first half of the twentieth century.1 National Guard leaders nevertheless worked against this loss of identity. Even before war broke out in Europe, they were lobbying for their special interests in an effort to resist the consolidating trends within the Army. Not only did the Guard want to be treated as the Army’s principal reserve force, it also wanted National Guard units to retain their local and state identities even as they received the benefits of the Army’s professional expertise. Major General Milton A. Reckord, the adjutant general of the Maryland National Guard and the chairman of the legislative committee of the National Guard Association, clashed with Army chief of staff General George C. Marshall over Army Regulation 130-10, National Guard: Call and Draft into National Service. Reckord believeditdidnotpayproperrespecttotheNationalGuard :“Whoeverisresponsible for the draft, in my opinion, lacked the proper conception of the position the National Guard now occupies as a part of the Army of the United States.”2 He had reason to worry. One clause in the regulation did imply the elimination of National Guard state distinctiveness. During a presidential “order,” guardsmen merged with the Army into a single body “without unnecessary distinction between individuals or units based on their component state of origin.”3 Complaining about the regulation, Reckord embarked on a letter- Relations with the Army and State Identity | 11 writing campaign to adjutant generals in other states. Marshall beseeched him to be circumspect, since animosity between the Guard and the War Departmentharmedbothservices ,andbluntlyreprimandedhimforfosteringdistrust between state and federal authorities...