The Phenomenology of Religious Life

Chapter Three: The Phenomenon of the Historical

Chapter Three The Phenomenon of the Historical§ 7. The Historical as Core Phenomenon We want now to attempt to set forth a core phenomenon that reigns through the connections of meaning of the three words in the title (“Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion”). This core phenomenon is the “historical.” Insofar as we then intend to view the historical as core phenomenon of what is meant by the title, we will immediately find out how far the phenomena which occupy us can be characterized as historical. To what degree are “Introduction ,” “Philosophy,” “Religion” historical phenomena? It goes without saying that the introduction to a science is historical. Science is a complex of timelessly valid principles. The process of introduction proceeds, on the contrary , in time, is dependent upon the particular, factical-historical situation of science, etc. The same holds for philosophy and religion. They are also subordinate to historical development. But is the historical not precisely a matter of indifference for philosophy, which seeks the eternally valid? Moreover, does not the characterization as “historical” fit any phenomenon one likes? Yet if we now assert that the philosophical problematic is motivated on principle from the historical, so is this possible only insofar as the concept of the historical is polysemous. In any case, the necessity arises of grasping the problem of the historical principally, and not to content oneself with the considerations of a sound common sense. We have characterized philosophy and religion by subsuming it under the historical: “Philosophy and religion are historical phenomena.” (Just as: “The Feldberg and the Kandel are mountains,” or “The university, the cathedral, and the train station are buildings.”) How such a characterization of philosophy is possible is a problem; philosophy subsists, at any rate, in factical life experience. General concepts are handled like objects, so that one moves in a circle with characterizations through general concepts, and never leaves the realm of objects. Now the question is whether the possibility exists of discovering another sense of “historical” altogether, one which cannot be predicated of objects in this way. Perhaps today’s concept of the historical is only a derivation of this original concept. To this aim, we must inspect more carefully in which sense the characterization “historical,” which we have just performed, is to be understood. Historical means here becoming, emergence, proceeding in time, a characterization that befits a reality. Insofar as one re- § 7 [32–34] 23 mains within the cognitive consideration of the connections among objects, each characterization or use of the sense of “historical” is always determined through this foreconception of the object. The object is historical; it has the particularity of proceeding in time, of changing. We proceed not from the usual philosophy of history, which has the task ex professo of dealing with the historical. We mean the historical in the way we encounter it in life; not in the science of history. “Historical” means not only proceeding in time—that is to say, it is not only a characterization which befits a complex of objects. But in factical life experience and in the straightforward , attitudinal [einstellungshaften] evolution of philosophy, the historical, in accordance with this view, obtains the character of a quality of an object changing in time. In a much broader sense than the historical facts existing in the brain of a logician—which results only from a theory of science which empties out the living phenomena—the historical is immediate vivacity. a) “Historical Thinking” “Historical consciousness” is said to distinguish our present culture from others . Historical thinking indeed determines our culture; it disturbs our culture: firstly, in that it provokes, excites, stimulates; secondly, in that it hinders. This means (1) a fulfillment; life gains its foothold in the diversity of the historical; (2) a burden. Thus the historical is a power, against which life seeks to assert itself. One would have to consider the development of historical consciousness in the living cultural history. I refer you to Dilthey, who, I am convinced, has not grasped the core of the problem. What Troeltsch says about this—and also about the Reformation—is essentially influenced by Dilthey and, in terms of content, only determines it more closely. 1. The worldization [Verweltlichung] and the self-sufficiency of factical life—that one wants to secure one’s own life by worldly means—lead to a tolerance of alien views, through which one wants to gain a new security. From there stems today’s fury to...