Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION The Philological Purpose of the Lecture and Its Presuppositions§1. The Philological Purpose of the Lecture: Consideration of Some Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy in Their Conceptuality The purpose of this lecture is to gain an understanding of some basic concepts of Aristotelian philosophy, specifically through an engagement with the text of the Aristotelian treatises. Basic concepts--not all, but some, and so presumably the primary matters with which Aristotelian research is occupied. As for the selection of these basic concepts, we are in a favorable position since a treatise has come down to us from Aristotle himself that consists simply of definitions of these basic concepts: the treatise has come down to us as Book 5 of the Metaphysics. Still, we cannot depend on this favorable situation as we are not in a position to understand Aristotle in the way that his students did. The following enumeration is given in order to provide a preliminary grasp of the basic concepts treated in Book 5. The first chapter concerns ἀρχή. The second chapter treats of αἴτιον, and the third of στοιχεῖον, or “element.” The fourth chapter deals with φύσις, the fifth with ἀναγκαῖον, or “necessity” as a determination of being; and the sixth with ἕν, the seventh with ὄν, and the eighth with οὐσία, or “being-there.” The ninth chapter is concerned with ταὐτά, or “sameness,” and the tenth with ἀντικείμενα, or “being-other.” The eleventh chapter treats of πρότερα and ὕστερα, not only in a temporal sense but also in a concrete sense--the concrete πρότερον being that which goes back to the “origin ” (γένος), and the concrete ὕστερον being “that which is added on later,” for example, συμβεβηκός. The twelfth chapter concerns δύναμις, the thirteenth concerns ποσόν or “how many,” the category of “quantity,” and the fourteenth concerns ποιόν, the category of “quality.” The fifteenth chapter deals with πρός τι, “modes of relation,” and the sixteenth with τέλειον, “completedness,” that which determines beings as “the completed” in their “being-completed.” The issue in chapter 17 is πέρας, while that of chapter 18 is τὸ καθό, or “the in-itself.” Chapter 19 treats of διάθεσις, “position,” “occasion”; and chapter 20 treats of ἕξις, “having-in-itself,” or “being positioned thus and so” toward something. Chapter 21 is concerned with πάθος, “condition,” “disposition,” and chapter 22 with στέρησις, the determination of a being that is fulfilled by what the being does not have. This στέρησις, “not-having,” determines a be- 4 Introduction [4–5] ing in a fully positive manner; that it is not thus and so, is constitutive of its being. Chapter 23 deals with ἔχειν, and chapter 24 with ἔκ τινος εἶναι, or “that from which something arises or of which it consists.” Chapter 25 is concerned with μέρος, “part” in the sense of aspect, chapter twenty-six with ὅλον, the “whole,” chapter 27 with κολοβόν, “the mutilated,” and chapter 28 with γένος, “lineage,” “descent.” Chapter 29 concerns ψεῦδος, and chapter 30 concerns συμβεβηκός, that “which is added on to something,” that “along with which something is.”1 We must see the ground out of which these basic concepts have arisen, as well as how they have so arisen. That is, the basic concepts will be considered in their specific conceptuality so that we may ask how the matters themselves meant by these basic concepts are viewed, in what context they are addressed, in which particular mode they are determined. If we approach the matter from this point of view, we will arrive at the realm of what is meant by concept and conceptuality. The basic concepts are to be understood with regard to their conceptuality, specifically, with the purpose of gaining insight into the fundamental exigencies of scientific research. Here, we offer no philosophy, much less a history of philosophy. If philology means the passion for knowledge of what has been expressed, then what we are doing is philology. As for Aristotle, his philosophy, and its development, you will find everything you need in the book of the classical philologist Jaeger.2 In this work, Jaeger distinguishes himself by claiming that Aristotle’s writings are not books, but rather summaries of treatises that Aristotle did not publish but only conveyed as lectures. (Jaeger’s interpretation has been known for quite some time, since it was explicitly articulated in an earlier work on Aristotle’s Metaphysics.)3 Thus, from now on, any attempt to treat the fourteen treatises of the Metaphysics as a single work and to see in them a unified presentation of the Aristotelian “system” must be curtailed. Regarding the personality of a philosopher, our only interest is that he was born at a certain time, that he worked, and that he died. The character...