Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy

CHAPTER THREE The Interpretation of the Being-There of Human Beings with regard to the Basic Possibility of Speaking-with-One-Another Guided by Rhetoric

CHAPTER THREE The Interpretation of the Being-There of Human Beings with regard to the Basic Possibility of Speaking-with-One-Another Guided by Rhetoric§13. Speaking-Being as Ability-to-Hear and as Possibility of Falling: The Double-Sense of Ἄλογον (Nicomachean Ethics Α13; De Anima Β4) So far, this consideration came to a preliminary end when we set forth the basic determinations that pertain to this being of human beings. We reached the definition of the being of the ζωή of human beings. Aristotle defines it as ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ’ ἀρετὴν τελείαν.1 Ἐνέργεια is a character of those beings that are ensouled, that are in the mode of being in a world. Ζωή is a type of living that is there in an active mode, such that this being-there lives genuinely in concern, so that it has its τέλος in such a way that it brings the being-there of the human being to its genuine end. In the concrete elaboration of the being of human beings, ἀρετή must now be dealt with. This also coincides with Book 1 of the Nicomachean Ethics, the detailed consideration of the ἀρεταί. You can see from the preceding what this topic genuinely means by keeping the aim of the consideration in view. We will not follow out the consideration of the ἀρεταί. Here, we are not interested in the concrete elaboration of the interpretation of being-there, but rather in another aspect that is found here, namely, that the being of human beings , ἐνέργεια κατ’ ἀρετήν, has the character of speaking: πρᾶξις μετὰ λόγου. In a certain sense, this consideration goes together with the others (κατ’ἀρετὴν τελείαν). Here, we put the emphasis on the μετὰ λόγου insofar as we are always inquiring into the λόγος, into that speaking about, and addressing of, the world, wherein concept and conceptuality are at home. We are seeking the basis, the indigenous character, of concept formation in being-there itself. Concept formation is not an accidental affair, but a basic possibility of being-there itself insofar as being-there has made a decision in favor of science. The preliminary determination of ζῷον λόγον ἔχον already showed that a basic character of being-there as ζῷον πολιτικόν is revealed therein: the human being is in the mode of being-with-one-another; the basic determination of 1. Eth. Nic. Α 13, 1102 a 5 sq. 72 The Interpretation of the Being-There of Human Beings [104–105] its being itself is being-with-one-another. This being-with-one-another has its basic possibility in speaking, that is, in speaking-with-one-another, speaking as expressing-oneself in speaking-about-something.Λόγος comes into play not only with this fundamental determination, but also precisely where Aristotle poses the question concerning the possible ἀρεταί. The investigation thereof is divided according to the investigative clue that Aristotle himself carries through with regard to the λόγον ἔχον. The λόγον ἔχον is only superficially clarified. An entire series of determinations is found therein. The being-there of human beings, characterized as λόγον ἔχον, is more precisely determined by Aristotle in such a way that in the human being itself, its speaking-being still plays a fundamental role. In being-with-one-another, one can be the one speaking and the other the one hearing. Ἀκούειν, “hearing,” is genuine αἴσθησις. Whether or not seeing in connection with θεωρεῖν reveals the world in the genuine sense, it is still hearing because it is the perceiving of speaking, because it is the possibility of being-with-one-another. The human being is not only a speaker and a hearer, but is for itself such a being that hears itself. Speaking, as self-expression-about-something, is at the same time a speaking-to-oneself. Therefore, the definition of λόγον ἔχον further contains in itself that the human being also has λόγος in the mode of hearing this, its own speaking. In human beings, there is a being-possibility that is to be characterized as ὑπακούειν. Aristotle exhibits this basic phenomenon through concrete contexts of being-there themselves, through peculiar phenomena that are touched upon in Book 1, Chapter 13 of the Nicomachean Ethics, and that Aristotle designates as παράκλησις, “incitement,” νουθέτησις, “making notable ,” ἐπιτίμησις, “reproach.”2 All of these modes of natural speaking-withone -another carry in themselves the claim that the other does not merely take notice of something, but takes something up, follows something, reflects on something. The other repeats that which is spoken in such a way that in repeating he listens to it, such that the following results: in the being of the human being as concernful lies the possibility of listening to its speaking. This possibility of hearing, this ἀκουστικόν,3 is more precisely found...