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Conclusion: Unity of Command
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330 Conclusion: Unity of Command A Cadet will not lie, steal, or cheat, nor will he tolerate anyone who does. Honor Code “For every objective, insure unity of effort under one responsible commander . This principle insures that all efforts are focused on a common goal.”1 Usually this definition is interpreted as “one boss for the job.” But its implications run deeper. Unity of command is the tool required to see that all effort is focused on the one condition that causes the enemy to collapse . Virtually every military officer, including the senior commanders during the fall of 1944, emphatically supports unity of command. Yet the command environment during the Fall of Frustration was anything but unified. Eisenhower was the single boss. The campaign plan that Ike and his staff formulated was competent. As with most battle plans, there were plausible alternatives. Once an operation begins, time literally is “of the essence.” The minute taken to re-argue the best course of action may be the one “unforgiving minute” of hesitation that causes our destruction. Remember the enemy is trying to his utmost to do to you what you are trying to do to him. In addition to creating concentration of effort, unity of command improves our agility, our ability to react faster than our opponent. As Patton said, “Good is enemy of the best.” A good plan executed in time is far preferable to the best plan conceived too late to catch the enemy. As we have seen, a smaller but more agile opponent can stop a stronger adversary. The contemporary term is getting inside the enemy’s decision-making loop, which is the reason we spend so much on communication technology. Conclusion · 331 After having their views heard and after the boss made his decision, several of Eisenhower’s seniormost lieutenants were unwilling to comply with their commander’s intent. In September, by following their own ideas instead of SHAEF strategy, they wrecked any chances of ending the war before Christmas. Anyone who has tried to get something done quickly within a large organization knows the usefulness of unity of command. Napoleon once said, “It is better to have one bad general than two good ones.” When the council of war finishes, so does the debate. Juniors again become subordinates, whose sole task is to faithfully execute the intentions of their commander. Asking senior officers to sublimate their personal and institutional egos sounds a little Pollyannaish. So does asking some dogface to advance in the direction of some people he doesn’t know who are trying to kill him and who keep throwing hot metal at him. If the nation can ask the individual soldier to risk his life for his country, can’t the nation ask the general to holster his ego? Our greatest general, George C. Marshall, did so without a prompt. Contemporary warfare has become extremely complex. It takes a cast of thousands to control it, let alone fight it. Councils of war, committee work, have gained in importance. As long as military courtesy is observed, each officer should be, must be, allowed to air his or her views and the concerns of the organization that officer represents. Eisenhower was a master at conducting such councils. The solitary field marshal studying his maps in a private caravan had become an anachronism. History demonstrates that the definition of unity of command needs a corollary: Any subordinate who adopts an agenda that is inconsistent with either his commander’s orders or intent is in violation of the principle of Unity of Command. Professional (as opposed to mercenary) armies exist because of the deeply held belief structures of their members. Adding this corollary to unity of command is the best way of inculcating a much-needed change in behavior. Military cadets need to hear this during their first lecture about the principles of war. Maybe it will inculcate the small voice that admonishes “the right thing to do” that all people need to hear from time to time. Every officer expects his men to obey orders. How can any general think the same does not apply to him? History shows that a lot of them did. Patton was an astute student of why men fought. He would have been astonished to find some Third Army soldiers thought him a self-serving blowhard. If some guiding principle had directed him to more carefully examine his own [107.23.85.179] Project MUSE (2024-03-19 02:50 GMT) 332...