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8 Opportunity in the South
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284 8 Opportunity in the South The Allies should advance on more than one axis of advance to keep the Germans guessing as to the direction of our main thrust, cause them to extend their forces, and lay the German forces open to defeat in detail. A single axis would lead us to collisions with the enemy main forces on narrow fronts and with no power of maneuver or surprise. SHAEF Staff, “Post Overlord Planning,” 18 May 1944 On 15 August, the anniversary of Napoleon’s birth, Seventh Army landed along the Côte d’Azur in southern France. Seventh Army contained a single U.S. corps composed of veteran divisions of the Italian campaign and an amalgamation of French divisions in varying states of organization and equipment. The landings unfolded textbook-like against limited opposition . Time labeled the landings “A Tactician’s Dream.”1 The attack up the Rhone valley has been dubbed “the Champagne Campaign.” The Germans retreated as rapidly as possible. A procession of feted Allies followed them up the valley. At times, it looked more like a victory procession than a combat maneuver. A great expanse of southern France was liberated at very little Allied expense. Logistical succor for the Allies was supposed to gush forth from Dragoon . For the first several months that did not happen. Tonnage flowing north was insufficient to support Seventh Army, let alone contribute to Bradley’s units that had advanced from the west. No fresh bread or meat was available in Seventh Army until 26 September. At times troops were ordered to subsist on two-thirds of a K ration a day. Again, the problem was a shortage of trucks. To meet the problem, rehabilitation of rail lines up the Rhone was accelerated.2 The landing of railway units was moved ahead of additional combat units. Until Marseilles was linked to the front with rail service, the southern approach would be of no logistic assistance to Ike. Opportunity in the South · 285 When Patch issued a new directive on 29 September, available logistics could not support major offensive action.3 Instead, Seventh Army’s supply situation was critical.4 As in ETO-supported units, there were massive shortages of artillery and mortar ammunition. These constraints were not alleviated until the second week in October. The all-too-familiar story of a supply-induced delay gave German Nineteenth Army time to fortify itself in the woods and mountains of Alsace. Vosges, the Belfort Gap, and the Saverne Gap Two approaches toward Germany led from the tip of the Rhone Valley (see map 8.1). The obvious approach was through the “Belfort Gap” (B on map 8.1) between the Vosges and the west bank of the Rhine. But a jump due east across the Rhine below Strasbourg led into the Black Forest—and nowhere. The second approach (A on map 8.1) enters the Lorraine Gateway where Third Army was struggling. Patton had little force south of Lüneburg, especially when XV Corps was transferred to Seventh Army later in the fall. The Marne-Rhine Canal complicates matters in the eastern portion of Lorraine. But a little work with unit boundaries could have provided room for Seventh Army to advance via Saarburg to the Rhine in the vicinity of Manheim. An attack on this axis could have become either a southern pincer targeted on the Saar or the beginning of an advance on Frankfurt. Recall this is the secondary thrust line outlined in Ike’s initial directive (FWD13765—chapter 3). An Epinal–Baccarat–Saarburg approach would encounter some hills. Then again most of Lorraine was hilly. The Vosges mountains split the Lorraine gateway from the Belfort gap in Alsace. They run from southwest to northeast. The Saverne Gap, which connects the Alsatian plain to the Rhine Valley, bifurcates the range. To the southwest, the mountains are called the High Vosges. Peaks rise to 1,300 meters. The Low Vosges are far more dissected and irregular. They pre sent a far more difficult barrier to military movement. Throughout history, these mountains have been viewed as an impenetrable refuge. Ruins of pre-Christian redoubts remain. No army had ever forced a crossing. The Vosges road network in 1944 was sparse—barely adequate for division -sized operations. Most roads followed valley floors flanked by forested, sharply rising mountains. Commanders on both sides described fighting in the close terrain of the Vosges as being similar to jungle fighting.5 The Saverne Gap itself provides a...