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7 November Rerun
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233 7 November Rerun In effect we are there. General Bradley, 23 November 1944 As SHAEF’s senior officers gathered in Brussels on 18 October, they collectively felt a lot of frustration. The promise of war’s early end had been grounded out in unsuccessful operations stretching from the Scheldt to the Ardennes. Montgomery’s great diversion toward Arnhem was an operational failure. The combination of Monty’s dalliance south of the Maas in early September and Market Garden had prevented the Allies from securing Antwerp. At the meeting, Monty expressed optimism about finally clearing the Scheldt. U.S. First Army had finally surrounded Aachen on the 14th. But Hodges had failed to break through to the Rhine—or even the Roer. First Army suffered twenty thousand casualties in its failed attempt. By design, Patton’s secondary attack had not moved beyond Metz. Although he came close, Patton did not break through. After the war many senior German generals, Rundstedt, Blumentritt (Rundstedt’s chief of staff), Student, and Westphal, among others, stated that a strong push from Belgium across the Rhine and into Germany would have easily succeeded.1 Horrocks led a corps-size assault to Arnhem, as did Collins past Aachen toward Stolberg, but neither broke through. However tumultuous it looked from the German side, there were still a lot of Germans in the field who were ready to defend the Fatherland. Ike was under a lot of pressure. Marshall had just completed a weeklong visit to the European Theater. The chief “made no effort to disguise his unhappiness with the strategic situation, particularly Antwerp.”2 He still sought victory in Europe by New Years and explicitly said so in a cable to Eisenhower.3 The Combined Chiefs of Staff began a formal study of an 234 · The Battle for Western Europe, Fall 1944 all-out offensive to finish off Hitler by year end.4 Marshall wanted to put it all on the line. Use previously top-secret proximity-fuse artillery shells. Use all the supplies. Commit all Allied troop units, including those that might otherwise be refitted and retrained for 1945 operations. The British field marshals, Montgomery and Brooke, did little to hide their continuing contempt of Eisenhower’s generalship. While at the Combined Chiefs’ meeting in Quebec on 22 September, Brooke penned in his diary, “[T]he opportunity for decisive victory at the decisive point before winter had passed.” During Marshall’s European visit, Monty requested and was granted a private meeting. The field marshal complained that Ike’s command of ground operations was “ragged and disjointed,” that Ike “lacked a firm grip,” and that “operational direction and control were lacking.”5 Marshall barely retained his cool. In his inimical way, Monty completely misread the meeting and wrote that “I gave him [Marshall] my views on the present organization for command. I think it did some good.”6 Ike understood there would be no silver bullet striking a secret vital organ that would bring the monster to the ground. He confided in FDR’s press secretary, Steve Early: “People of the strength and warlike tendencies of the Germans do not give in; they must be beaten into the ground.”7 But Ike couldn’t seem to find a flank to turn or a gap to penetrate. The monster held him at bay. As early as 25 September, planners were assuming that Antwerp would not be open before 28 October. The Germans were getting stronger. Nubs of twenty-five shattered divisions had been rebuilt as volks grenadier divisions. Building from a core of veteran officers and noncoms leveraged the value of new conscripts. It created battle-worthy divisions in the shortest possible time. An additional fifteen divisions were formed up from scratch.8 A major effort would be required to overcome the heavy resistance encountered along the German frontier. The Allies needed more troop strength in order to resume the advance. Only Antwerp’s docks could support them. Tonnage constraints limited the Allied buildup. Additional divisions entered the continent, but logisticians stated they could support no more than twenty in active combat. Even Brooke agreed the Allies must secure the Scheldt. The Joint Planning Staff of the Combined Chiefs echoed the convention: launching an all-out offensive before the opening of Antwerp “would be to court failure.”9 Logistical problems remained enormous but had changed their complexion . Recall that the high-tonnage transportation system was a working railroad connected to a port. By the beginning of November, ports...