Palestinian and Israeli Public Opinion: The Public Imperative in the Second Intifada

7. From Geneva to Disengagement: Opportunities and Constraints

90 palestinian and israeli public opinion chapter seven From Geneva to Disengagement Opportunities and Constraints Now the Palestinians bear the burden of proof. They must fight terror organizations , dismantle its infrastructure and show sincere intentions of peace in order to sit with us at the negotiating table. —From Prime Minister Sharon’s statement on the day the Gaza Disengagement Plan was implemented, August 15, 2005 I attach supreme importance to taking all steps, which will enable progress toward resolution of the conflict with the Palestinians. However, in light of the other challenges we are faced with, if the Palestinians do not make a similar effort toward a solution of the conflict I do not intend to wait for them indefinitely. —From Prime Minister Sharon’s speech at the Herzliya Conference, December 18, 2003 A credible political process is essential for turning the tide of the last four years: a process that will lead to a permanent end to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. A process that assures both peoples that they will not have to live again through the uncertainty and instability of another interim period. Only in the context of such a process will we be able to consolidate the security, democracy, and reform steps that we have been taking. . . . It is in this context of a credible political horizon that the Geneva Initiative is crucial. —Yasser Abed Rabbo, Member of the PLO Executive Committee and the Palestinian Architect of the Geneva Initiative, speaking at the Herzliya Conference, December 16, 2004 from geneva to disengagement 91 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 The height of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in terms of violence and fatalities occurred in 2002. Suicide bombings peaked on the Israeli side, and Israel launched Operation Defensive Shield and reoccupied the West Bank. The year 2003 was still bloody but less so than 2002, and in addition to the ongoing fighting it also featured political and diplomatic initiatives. In March Abu Mazin was appointed prime minister of the PA. Soon after, the Quartet’s Roadmap for peace was officially presented. In September Abu Ala was appointed to replace Abu Mazin after his resignation. In October the Geneva Initiative was publicized, and in December Ariel Sharon announced his Gaza Disengagement Plan. The discussion in this chapter focuses on three important crossroads in the Al-Aqsa Intifada: the Geneva Initiative, Sharon’s Disengagement Plan, and the consequent political turnabouts in Israel and the PA in the parliamentary elections in both societies in early 2006 (Shamir 2007). These events are intimately related; all three are a function of public opinion, though in different ways, and at the same time have shaped Palestinian and Israeli public opinion and the Israeli-Palestinian two-level game. The analysis supports our claim in chapter 3 that public opinion should not be viewed only as a constraint on policy, but that it can also create important opportunities to leaders involved in two-level games. Finally, we provide an in-depth analysis of public opinion on the permanent status framework and long-range prospects for normalization and reconciliation. From Geneva to Disengagement The Geneva Accord was a track II initiative led by a group of Israeli and Palestinian doves to draft a full-blown proposal for an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement that would demonstrate that there is substantial common ground for a comprehensive peace agreement between Palestinians and Israelis. The initiative was unveiled in mid-October 2003 and officially launched on December 1, at a ceremony in Geneva. Talks leading to the initiative were held over two years following the failure of the Taba talks in early 2001, while the Intifada was raging and hopes for a settlement were at a low point. Some of the participants were veterans from previous official and nonofficial negotiations. Building on those negotiations the two teams, headed by Yossi Beilin and Yasser Abed Rabbo, attempted to address the thorniest issues in dispute between the two sides, including the issue of the refugees and the status of Jerusalem. 92 palestinian and israeli public opinion The Geneva Accord was widely publicized in both societies and was further disseminated to the Israeli public by direct mail and to the Palestinian public through newspaper inserts. Public...