Chieftaincy, the State, and Democracy: Political Legitimacy in Post-Apartheid South Africa

3. The Making of a Mixed Polity: The Accommodation and Transformation of the Chieftaincy

80 | chieftaincy, the state, and democracy The Making of a Mixed Polity The Accommodation and Transformation of the Chieftaincy In a purely republican democracy . . . , no constitutional space exists for the official recognition of any traditional leaders. There is no reason why African customs and traditions should be seen to be in conflict with the demands of modern governance. What is required is an innovative institutional arrangement, which combines the natural capacities of both traditional and elected local government to advance the development of rural areas and communities. It is the Department’s considered view that the institution has a place in our democracy, and has a potential to transform and contribute enormously towards the restoration of the moral fibre of our society and in the reconstruction and development of the country, especially the rural areas. This chapter examines the national debates concerning the chieftaincy in the 1990s and how the chieftaincy has been officially integrated into the post-apartheid constitutional order, from the writing of the 1993 interim constitution to the adoption of the TLGF Act in 2003 and the Communal Land Act in 2004. I argue that through a series of policies the post-apartheid South African government has sought to simultaneously accommodate and transform the chieftaincy as it has attempted to introduce democratic norms, processes , and institutions into the former Bantustan areas. In short, its aim has been to create a mixed polity where the chieftaincy and democratic institutions exist together. An analysis of these formal arrangements, as well as the debates surrounding them, highlights the competing, and three the making of a mixed polity | 81 sometimes conflicting, visions that exist at the national level concerning the appropriate role of the chieftaincy in the post-apartheid era. It also reveals the inherent tension between accommodation and transformation and the unanticipated results of such a process. For the African National Congress, the end of apartheid encompassed more than the repeal of segregationist legislation or the establishment of one person, one vote. Instead, it signaled the beginning of a “transformative movement” that it hoped would alter preexisting political, social, and economic relations.1 As Thabo Mbeki stressed at the end of the Fiftieth National Conference of the ANC in 1997, we must transform the machinery of state as speedily as possible to ensure that this becomes an instrument that serves the interests of the people . . . we must continue to pursue the objectives of high and sustained economic growth and development to achieve a visible improvement in the standard of living of our people, with special emphasis on the poor . . . [and] we must continue the struggle to devote greater and greater amounts of public resources to the goal of meeting the social needs of the people. (Mbeki 1997) Likewise, in the 1999 State of the Nation Address, he stressed the “the enormity of the challenge we face to succeed in creating the caring society we have spoken of.” It was something that could “not be carried out by the government alone”; instead, it is a national task that calls for the mobilisation of the whole nation into united people’s action, into a partnership with government for progressive change and a better life for all, for a common effort to build a winning nation. The Government therefore commits itself to work in a close partnership with all our people . . . to ensure that we draw on the energy and genius of the nation to give birth to something that will surely be new, good and beautiful.” (Mbeki 1999) Of course, the chieftaincy has not escaped the reach of this transformation process. Not surprisingly, the ANC has argued that the transformation process is not intended to destroy the chieftaincy, but rather, to reestablish its dignity and respect, which were wrenched from it during colonialism and apartheid.2 More specifically, the ANC has asserted that the transformation of the chieftaincy will only restore its legitimacy, which was lost during apartheid. Thus, in the Draft White Paper on 82 | chieftaincy, the state, and democracy Traditional Leadership and Governance, the DPLG stated that the central objective of the policy framework was to “define the place and role of the chieftaincy within the new system of democratic governance, transform the institution in line with constitutional imperatives, and restore the integrity and legitimacy of the institution of the chieftaincy in lines with customary law and practices” (Republic of South Africa 2002: 7). Despite promises that the...