Monotheism and Tolerance: Recovering a Religion of Reason

7 Cohen and the Monotheism of Correlation

Hermann Cohen is the third and most successful member of the religion of reason trajectory.1 Cohen’s approach to the problematic intolerance inherent in the monotheistic worldview constitutes a significant departure from the respective approaches of Mendelssohn and Kant. What most dramatically distinguishes Cohen’s efforts from those of his predecessors , at least in regard to the problem of monotheistic intolerance, is that he completely embraces what J. B. Schneewind has termed the ‘Socrates story’ of morality, in contrast to Kant and especially Mendelssohn, who remain ensnared in the ‘Pythagoras story.’ Whereas the Pythagoras story disputes the possibility of progress in moral understanding, given that morality is bound up with an event of revelation or disclosure of some sort in the past, the Socrates story holds that morality is a matter of discovery, of breaking with the past. Since both the Pythagoras and Socrates stories are intimately connected with basic philosophical/theological understandings of the world, it should not be surprising that the story or paradigm one holds has great implications for one’s treatment of monotheistic intolerance . The Socrates story as a paradigm for understanding morality, and knowledge in general, is more reconcilable with the discursive structure of the worldview of elective monotheisms than is the Pythagoras story. The philosophical commitments of Mendelssohn and Kant are driven by their Pythagorean philosophies in the direction of symmetry with regard to the Other, and as a result are ill-equipped to deal with the demands Cohen and the Monotheism of Correlation 7 132   |   Cohen of an asymmetrical relationship with the Other which is inherent in the discursive structure of the elective-monotheistic worldview. Consequently, Mendelssohn struggles to keep his natural theology coherent with his scriptural theology, and Kant virtually sacrifices all Christian commitments to an ideal ‘religion of reason’ which is rooted in ethics. Cohen, however, in rejecting the ‘Pythagoras story’ for the ‘Socrates story,’ and in embracing the notion of discovery concerning the truths of ethics2 and religion (the two fields are inseparable, if also irreducible for him,3 as we will see), also rejects the value of tolerance, a key component of the respective positions of both Mendelssohn and Kant. In short, Cohen’s solution is to embrace the intolerant orbit of the monotheistic worldview, and to accept the asymmetrical relationship with the Other that results from it. The success of his endeavor derives from his ability to render this intolerance humane and ethical, rather than trying to diminish or banish it entirely.4 If we recall, Mendelssohn and Kant each attempt to dissolve the potential for violence plaguing elective monotheisms by introducing heterogeneous elements, elements constitutive of their respective notions of the order of rational universalism, into the scripturally universal structure of the monotheistic worldview. In doing so they hoped to thereby soften or eradicate the conditions in the latter which generate intolerance. In both cases the integration of the rationally universal elements with the scripturally universal ones remains problematic. Cohen, however, utilizes rather than subverts the asymmetry at the heart of the monotheistic worldview that is incompatible with the modern notions of tolerance and pluralism. Rather than attempt to dismantle or reconfigure the moments of the discursive structure of the elective-monotheistic worldview, Cohen argues that these monotheisms can produce, or develop from within, a form of intolerance that is nevertheless ethical. While Cohen’s position eschews all forms of religious violence, it cannot be said to be tolerant since it actively works for the conversion of the Other through the bearing-witness modality of promulgation. Unlike Mendelssohn’s conception of bearing witness, Cohen’s account is not content to wait until the eschaton for the conversion of the Other but takes action now. However, since in Cohen’s account, the notion of religion is itself a rational and therefore universal concept, what it means to either bear witness or convert is quite complex and rather counter -intuitive and thus requires explication. This modality of intolerance is thus at once both compatible with the monotheistic discursive structure and with the basic conditions for existence within a multicultural society, even if it itself does not approve of pluralism or tolerance. SinceCohendoesnotfollowhispredecessorsinattemptingtoameliorate and/or eliminate the intolerance inherent in the Abrahamic-monotheisms, but rather engages in the more feasible project of rendering monotheis- Cohen and the Monotheism of Correlation   |   133 tic intolerance humane, he has no need to import heterogeneous elements which undermine the moments of...