Monotheism and Tolerance: Recovering a Religion of Reason

6 Kant and the Religion of Tolerance

Kant and the Religion of Tolerance 6 Kant’s account of the ethical commonwealth is particularly tantalizing in the context of our investigation. This is so because it concerns the climactic realization of the teleological trajectory of history in which a radically new, non-violent ethical order emerges upon the earth, but also because this new order and its manifestation are inextricably bound up with, and yet transformative of, the structures of elective monotheism. In this new order of human affairs wherein human beings transform nature to reflect the interests of practical reason,1 humanity ceases to be mired in radical evil and rather, as Philip Rossi puts it, embarks upon “a form of social dynamics quite different from unsociable sociability.”2 This new social dynamic, which is the epitome of tolerance-as-inclusion, is constituted by a “mutual moral recognition of one another from which we, each and all, can thereby envision the possibility of constructing, on the basis of our freedom, a shared world.”3 Such a radical transformation, however, requires that the political world as we know it, a world constituted of the stuff of unsocial sociability, be transcended. To explain this movement of profound, world-historical change, Kant takes recourse to a discussion of the relationship of Judaism and Christianity. A New Supersessionism Kant sees his own philosophy as coming at a crucial point both in history and the history of philosophy.4 Kant understands himself Kant and the Religion of Tolerance   |   107 to be living in an “age of enlightenment” although, to be sure, this is not the same as an “enlightened age.”5 What this means is that human beings do not yet use their reason autonomously, but rather remain in “self-imposed immaturity,”6 i.e., they look to external authorities to make their decisions rather than thinking for themselves, particularly in regard to issues relating to religion. However, Kant believes his own age, as an ‘age of enlightenment ,’ is distinct, in that many of the impediments to the free thinking of individuals, especially the domination of ecclesiastical religious authorities over the hearts and minds of the masses, are beginning to weaken. The diminishing power of clerical authorities opens up the possibility for free thought and the possibility for a new world order to emerge, one that is based on autonomous reason. The Enlightenment, while primarily a European phenomenon, is understood by Kant to have world-historical implications.7 To be sure, Kant claims that all human beings, as possessors of practical reason, are aware, at least on some level, of the obligation to bring their religion more and more into accord with the ‘religion of reason.’ And yet, while it is incumbent upon all religions to make this transition, Kant makes no secret about the fact that he considers Christianity to be the most accomplished of all extant religions in achieving this concordance with the ‘religion of reason.’ The conditions necessary for fulfilling this transition, Kant believes, are emerging in this ‘age of enlightenment,’ when people (needless to say, primarily in Christian Europe) are beginning to think for themselves rather than submitting to the ‘self-incurred immaturity’ which allows ecclesiastical religious authorities to think and decide for them.8 In Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, Kant explains, If now one asks, What period in the entire known history of the church up to now is the best? I have no scruple in answering, the present. And this, because . . . the seed of the true religious faith [i.e., the religion of reason], as it is now being publicly sown in Christendom, though only by a few, is allowed more and more to grow unhindered.9 Thus, in this ‘age of enlightenment,’ Christianity is increasingly purging itself of the dogmatic dregs that have prevented it from realizing the rational ideal. This will allow Christianity to serve as a vanguard, with its example galvanizing other religious traditions to bring themselves into accordance with the ‘religion of reason.’10 Like Mendelssohn’s conception of Judaism, Kant understands Christianity as an amalgamation of a historical, revealed religion and a universal , rational religion. However, whereas Mendelssohn sees these two elements —revelation and reason—as ultimately symbiotic, Kant sees them as being in profound tension with one another. Thus, in sharp contrast to Mendelssohn, Kant sees his task as one of purifying Christianity of all 108   |   K a nt that is tied to revelation and...