Frenchness and the African Diaspora: Identity and Uprising in Contemporary France

9. A Conservative Revolution within Secularism: The Ideological Premises and Social Effects of the March 15, 2004, “Anti-Headscarf” Law

chapter nine AConservativeRevolutionwithinSecularism: TheIdeologicalPremisesandSocialEffectsofthe March15,2004,“Anti-Headscarf”Law Pierre Tévanian Translated by Naomi Baldinger F or almost two years,the campaign against“the headscarf at school” provoked political and media hysteria comparable to the Dreyfus Affair.1 Launched by the right-wing government in April 2003,and quickly endorsed by a large portion of the Left,even the extreme Left,this campaign resulted in the law of March 15,2004,which prohibited“wearing conspicuous symbols of religious affiliation.”Although the so-called Islamic headscarf was worn at the time by only one to two thousand students, and although its presence has become increasingly accepted in the educational environment, numerous alarmist and aggressive speeches on prime-time television turned veiled students into agents of “Islamic fundamentalism”(intégrisme islamique),“anti-intellectualism” (obscurantisme), or even “green fascism.”2 These speeches established equivalence, usually implied but sometimes assumed, between the simple right to wear the headscarf and the obligation to wear it, as it is imposed in countries such as Iran. The headscarf was stigmatized as an attack on the principle of secularism, but also as the ultimate symbol of “the oppression of women,” and even as an instrument of that oppression.Veiled teenagers were often accused of making other women TSHIMANGA_pages.indd 187 8/10/09 10:47:35 AM  / Pierre Tévanian look like “sluts,” implying that they were complicit with the chauvinism and rape committed by their “brothers.” Thus, the public debate quickly left the sphere of public education, evading attendant questions of social stigma, humiliation, and marginalization in the school system to become a vague,disembodied debate about the headscarf and Islamic fundamentalism. We will return to the social stigma of the headscarf, the adolescents who wear it, and their so-called brothers, who are suspected of forcing girls to wear the headscarf unless they manifest their secular allegiances by denouncing it. But before we return to this idea of stigmatization, let us first analyze the content of the March 15, 2004 law, and its implications for secular discourse, freedom of expression, and the right to education. The law, which was poorly received by the children of postcolonial immigrants when it was proposed to the National Assembly, was often presented by its proponents (and sometimes by its detractors) as an expression of the eternal “French essence.”3 For some, it gave new life to the glorious exception française: a difficult concept for foreigners to grasp, yet considered a worthy lesson for the rest of the world.4 For others, however, it encapsulates all the arrogance and intolerance of French society. In reality, the situation is more complex: although the law enjoyed a large consensus among political elites and the mainstream French media,a large portion of civil society opposed its putative exclusionism. At the beginning of the campaign, 45 percent of French citizens were opposed to a ban on the headscarf at school (49 percent supported it.) Better yet, only 22 percent supported the expulsion of a student who refused to remove her headscarf (Tévanian 2005). Beyond this, the anti-headscarf law has nothing to do with the essence of secular French culture.It actually breaks with legislation justified in the name of the secular. Paradoxically, the rhetoric of a“return to roots”has actually been used to promote a new law, leading to a radical transformation of French secularism. By imposing “neutrality” not only on the agents of the public educational system, but on its users as well, the law transforms the founding laws of French secular politics (those of 1880, 1882, 1886, and 1905).5 From 2003 to 2004, there has been a conservative revolution within the context of French secular politics,meaning that a“new order”was supported by conservative or reactionary rhetoric idealizing the past. By banning the headscarf at school, proponents of this rhetoric celebrate a supposed reaffirmation of forgotten principles, claiming TSHIMANGA_pages.indd 188 8/10/09 10:47:35 AM A Conservative Revolution within Secularism /  to have rediscovered the pertinence and relevance of Jules Ferry, Jean Jaurès, Léon Gambetta, and other monumental figures of the so-called Golden Age of the Third Republic, now “threatened” once again by the specter of religious values.I intend to show that deep within its objective and ideological presuppositions, the anti-headscarf law breaks with socalled progressive principles and is actually part of a profoundly reactionary ideology that...