In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

The years between 1904 and 1922 are all but synonymous with the Anglo-German naval race and the First World War, yet this was a period that saw five major wars involving great powers and two, not one, major naval races. It was a period that opened with the Russo-Japanese War (8 February 1904–6 September 1905) and then moved to the Italian-Turkish (29 September 1911–15 October 1912) and the Balkan (17 October 1912–10 August 1913) wars, the latter in many ways serving as the overture to the First World War (28 July 1914–11 November 1918), which in turn gave rise to a series of wars, the most notable being the Russian Civil War and Allied intervention (December 1917–October 1922). The latter, of course, was accompanied by the Russo-Polish War (April 1920–18 March 1921), and there was also the small matter of the Greco-Turkish War (May 1919–October 1922). Between 1906 and 1914, the unfolding Anglo-German naval race was one of the most important single items on a political and diplomatic agenda that made for an increasing militant and strident assertiveness that went hand in hand with an increasing sense of insecurity on the part of all the powers. Yet the First World War was witness to a second naval race in the Pacific between Japan and the United States, which after 1919–1920 was to be curbed in the attempt by the great powers to craft a new international order that included the first arms limitation arrangements. Inevitably this is a period dominated by the First World War. But the provision of explanation, as opposed to the mere recounting of events, presents immediate and very considerable difficulty, not least in terms of relating sea power to the Introduction 70 from port arthur to bucharest outcome of events. The main difficulty is the distinction between causation and occasion, between the causes of events and the point of time when these manifested themselves, and, of course, the latter provide cause and momentum. If one were permitted, one would cite two matters as examples of the difficulty of distinguishing between first explanation and narration and second causation and manifestation with reference to the First World War. * * * With reference to explanation and narration, one would cite the subject of trench-lock and its treatment by generations of historians. Here the problem of interpretation is obvious: several generations of historians and military commentators have provided the answer and, unfortunately, it is the wrong answer. There is no single answer because what is termed “trench-lock” was not the product of any one cause but the result of the coming together of a number of factors. Two, whether singly or in combination, always form the first line of alleged explanation : the superiority of defensive firepower over offensive firepower and the superiority of strategic mobility over tactical movement. One more matter is often cited as complementary to these two: the lack of the systems that in the Second World War were to unlock fronts. These individual systems are usually identified as the tank and aircraft, the point being that during the First World War their very limited capabilities precluded their use as the means of breakthrough. This raises the wider issue of context because the assumption that tanks and aircraft were the means of breakthrough is contentious and the fact is that these, in terms of their absence or very limited offensive capabilities, do not explain why there was deadlock in the first place. The critical development was not tanks, aircraft, or motor transport but the miniaturization of the radio, which made possible effective command and control at the point of contact, though in terms of unlocking of fronts it was the combination of tanks, aircraft, motor transport, and radio that was important, not one single development. The secondary factors usually paraded as explanation of trench-lock are that terrain worked against the attack, that surprise was difficult to achieve, and that the historical means of ensuring mobility, the use of an open flank, was not available. And to these can be added another: given the rapid degradation of formations committed to offensive operations, any attack invariably reached its culminating point very quickly—witness the returns registered in the British offensive at Amiens in August 1918. All these facts of life, and others , were at work and contributed to the tactical impasse of the First World War. It was very difficult to register surprise, and no...

Share