The Brusilov Offensive

Four Stalemate and Renewal

c h a p t e r f o u r Stalemate and Renewal By mid-June 1916, it appeared as if the Brusilov Offensive might provide the dramatic breakthrough to decide the war that generals on both sides and both fronts had been seeking for nearly two years. On the northern end of the front, the Russians appeared poised to overwhelm the combined forces of the Central Powers. Kaledin’s Eighth Army could drive southwest and take Lemberg (Lvov) or strike northwest toward Brest-Litovsk. In either case, a Russian success would imperil the entire Eastern Front. The Russian Seventh and Ninth armies, meanwhile, had broken the Habsburg line decisively in the south; Brusilov’s forces were moving forward in the Bukovina and threatening to carry the war into Hungary. Conrad’s offensive in the Tirol was grinding to a halt, and the Austro-Hungarians were scrambling for reserves. If Evert and Kuropatkin could prevent the Germans from sending reinforcements south while Kaledin regrouped, the Austro-German alliance might be shattered. If, moreover, the Russians could finally convince Romania to enter the war and provide reinforcements for their southern forces, the Habsburgs might be forced to sue for peace. “If Romania comes in now [ . . . ] that is the end of the war, and to our disadvantage no less,” Conrad told his adjutant.1 For a few days, the entire war seemed to hang in the balance. Both Conrad and Falkenhayn recognized the gravity of the situation and, despite personal reluctance on both sides, acted quickly to save the Central Powers’ position. Falkenhayn derided the abilities and performance Stalemate and Renewal 89 of the Habsburg troops, but he recognized that simply abandoning AustriaHungary to its fate would lead to the “speedy exhaustion” of Germany as well.2 The simultaneous collapse of the Habsburg Fourth and Seventh armies had brought Conrad to his senses as well; “the boss [Conrad] holds this to be the greatest crisis of the campaign,” Kundmann noted.3 Though Conrad still believed that “Italy is our destiny,” he realized that he had to make concessions if he expected German assistance. “In the end,” the Habsburg commander wrote, “the numbers of men and munitions alone decide the power.”4 Thus when Falkenhayn sent word on 7 June that he was sending four German divisions (the 108th Infantry Division, along with the 19th and 20th infantry divisions from Germany’s X Corps, and Division Rusche) to aid in the defense of Kovel, Conrad reluctantly agreed to meet the next day in Berlin to discuss moving troops from Tirol to Galicia. To his own commanders, Conrad had already conceded that the Austrian 9th and 61st infantry divisions would have to return to Galicia, but he feared that any concession to Falkenhayn would only be followed by further demands. Just going to Berlin was hard enough for Conrad; “It is the hardest punishment of all if one sends me to Falkenhayn,” he wrote.5 Falkenhayn’s first goal was to stage a counteroffensive that would reestablish the lines of 1915. In the long run, however, the German commander was determined to take control over the entire Eastern Front. In addition to the four divisions already promised for 14 June, the German commander indicated that a fifth, the 11th Bavarian Infantry Division, would be shifted to Hindenburg’s Eastern Command from the Western Front. In return, he expected Conrad to send no less than two and a half divisions from Tirol to Galicia. The plan was to form an attack group of seven and a half divisions (the four German divisions plus the Habsburg II Corps, the Austrian 29th Infantry Division, and the 89th Light Infantry Brigade) to halt the Russian initiative via a counterstroke. Two days later, Falkenhayn sent a telegram demanding that Linsingen be placed in command not only of the attack group, but also of the Austrian First and Fourth armies, in order to control the operation.6 The German commander also stipulated that full reports on the condition of the Habsburg units under Linsingen’s command be made available to the German general staff in order to facilitate accurate decisions. In the same communication, Falkenhayn opened the question of Pflanzer-Baltin’s competence, suggesting that it might be better if a German general were in command of the Austrian Seventh Army. On grounds that the Austro-Hungarian High Command had already proven unable to maintain the southern half of the front, Falkenhayn further proposed on [18.222.37.169...