Battle of Surigao Strait

14. “This has to be quick. Standby your torpedoes.”

14 “This has to be quick. Standby your torpedoes.” Aboard the battleships and cruisers Oldendorf’s officers had spent the last twenty minutes keyed up in almost unbearable tension as the Japanese fleet came steadily closer and the moment their leveled big guns would fire drew near. Though the range was still extremely far, eyes were already straining for hint of the approaching enemy to the south. Suddenly at 0312 a distant searchlight beam stabbed out and wavered around, as Yamashiro probed the darkness with its main lights. To Oldendorf, it reminded him of a “walking stick of a blind man being waved through the night, though what it touched we could not see.”1 Oldendorf was watching from Louisville’s flag bridge, standing in tense anticipation in the hot night with little breeze. The probing searchlight on the southern horizon winked out, and almost at the same moment Oldendorf began to get the first rush of reports from his DDs of their torpedo attack. At 0319 there came a sudden bright flash that even at this distance was clearly visible, as some ship exploded. There could be little doubting that a vessel had suffered catastrophe. Oldendorf and the others could only hope it wasn’t American. At 0324, as the second devastating torpedo attack on the Japanese was winding up, Oldendorf received a message from Captain Coward regarding the enemy force: “General opinion seems to be two battleships, one or two cruisers and one DD; some targets definitely hit. We saw large burst of fire. Could not tell what type of ship.” This was important news; the first clear indication Oley had that the number of Japanese capital ships he was facing was two, not four. This lessened the tension a little bit. Further, Louisville’s radar indeed showed five pips, the closest 26,900 yards away and approaching at about 15 knots.2 Another source of tension was the tactical situation developing as result of 185 186 · Battle ofSurigaoStrait the enemy’s manner of approach. If the Japanese continued on their head-on advance at Oldendorf’s heavy lines across the strait they would subject themselves to a classic naval maneuver dreamed about by naval instructors but rarely executed in reality. Known as “crossing the T,” the maneuver went back to the days of sailing ships with their rows of cannon. Since more guns bore on the target when broadside, a warship would seek to face the enemy with its side. Ideally, it would do so with the enemy ship end-on, so that few guns could bear to return the fire. Known as “raking” in the days of Trafalgar, the same principle continued to apply after the steel man-of-war had come along. That is, the strongest weight of fire came from broadside. A line of capital ships would seek to form a long horizontal to an enemy’s vertical in a “T” fashion, thus “crossing ” it. This would give a great advantage to the “crossing” admiral, and in fact Japanese Admiral Togo had used it to help defeat the Russian Baltic Fleet at the epic battle of Tsushima in 1904. It remained rare, for the enemy fleet could usually avoid it by simply turning aside to unmask their own broadsides, or even retreating. As he watched Nishimura’s force get ever closer, Oldendorf was on guard that his opponent would do just that and veer away at the last minute. At 0334 it came. Oldendorf received the half-expected word that could ruin his ambush. According to Berkey, his DDs had attacked the enemy and reported that the Japanese were retiring! Under the circumstances and given his careful arrangement of his heavy guns, this was disappointing news. Perhaps the Japanese commander had realized the futility of his effort, and was abandoning the penetration attempt. Oldendorf could hardly blame him, but would try to make sure the best targets did not slip away. He therefore one minute later ordered his left flank DDs (Desron 56) to leave their positions early and hasten down Surigao Strait after the retreating enemy. He told them to pursue and launch a torpedo attack, and especially try “to get the big boys.”3 ComDesron 56 Captain Roland Smoot aboard Newcomb was ready. He had been tracking the Japanese by radar since 0320. Though just one pip showed, TBS traffic indicated this was at least three ships. Smoot had already prepared accordingly, and so when Oldendorf’s order came in, he was...