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76 6 “Everybody aboard thought a BB could force a narrow strait.” That same morning at 0930 there had been a scare for Shima’s Second Striking Force as well, when enemy planes were detected by radar. Lookouts anxiously scanned the sky for the first hint of the specks in the air. After ten tense minutes , radar reported the formation was moving away. No aircraft ever came into view. Relieved, Shima ordered his small fleet to switch to Alert disposition. Whoever they were, they did not reappear. What Shima did not know was that yes, he had been sighted, but not by the group of planes attacking Nishimura. A land-based bomber of the V Army Air Force caught Shima at 1155 south of the Cagayan Islands, and Fifth Bomber command passed on the report. Though the report “demoted” Ashigara to a CL, it was otherwise accurate .1 When Kinkaid received it at 1435, he may have assumed it was an erroneous report of Nishimura’s force being sighted again, as a follow-up message reported the heavies as battleships. Actually, the B-24 had apparently gone on to sight Nishimura’s force, and mistakenly thought it the same as the first contact. At this time, Shima was some 100 miles from Nishimura but was pushing forward rapidly and steadily. By 1013 Shima was almost two hours ahead of his own schedule, and had already reached his planned noon position. Shifting course east 2YB commenced the dash for the entrance to the Mindanao Sea, expecting to reach it by 2000. Shima and chief of staff Matsumoto were drawing up the approach plans. At 1140 Nachi blinkered these to the others. Since enemy submarines were thought to be waiting in the western Mindanao Sea, upon entering they would cruise in No. 1 alert formation. Since subs were also expected at the entrance to Surigao Strait, upon approaching “EverybodyaboardthoughtaBBcouldforceanarrowstrait.” · 77 it 2YB would assume No. 3 formation. As they dashed through the entrance, two destroyers would drop depth charges randomly to discourage prowling subs. Which two “tin cans,” Shima left to ComDesRon 1 Masatomi Kimura on Abukuma.2 Since Shima did not see the PB4Y from Morotai that sighted his fleet at 1155, he optimistically concluded that he remained undetected. However, he learned at 1240 that Desdiv 21 was “catching it” again and that Hatsuharu and Hatsushimo were under attack and had suffered further loss. Shima began to fear that he would lose his detached DDs before he met them at sunset. He of course could do nothing about it. Ahead, Vice Admiral Nishimura was taking full inventory of the morning air raid’s aftermath. Flagship Yamashiro’s own starboard list had been corrected , and now he collected reports from the others. Having learned all the details, Nishimura had duly sent a spot report to Kurita, but no more planes had been seen. In light of this, Nishimura surely wondered how his superior Kurita was doing. In truth, Kurita’s 1YB was just undergoing its own first round of what would prove a long day. Air attack had ended for the Third Section, but for Kurita hammering from the sky was just beginning. To Nishimura the repelled air raid gave some cause for optimism, despite the odds. Precisely an hour after his report to Kurita came good indication of just what odds would be faced. Mogami’s scout arrived overhead, and buzzing first over Yamashiro and then Mogami, dropped on each warship’s deck a message container giving a report of what it had found at 0605 in Leyte Gulf: “4 battleships, 2 cruisers, 4 DDs, 15 aircraft carriers, 14 PT boats, and 80 transports in Leyte Gulf.”3 Daunting numbers to be sure, but at least the report appeared to be careful and accurate. Nishimura wasted not a minute acting on it. He radioed at 1225 to the No. 1 Attack Unit, which had already proceeded to Cebu, “to attack the enemy light craft (c. 10 in all) located along the northwest coast of Panaon Island at dusk October 24th.”4 At 1313 Nishimura had Negros island ahead and turned right to steam southeast along its coastline. This had the effect of bringing the fleet back to Nishimura’s originally planned course, and he was only slightly behind schedule as well. Whatever his reasons for his strange deviation from his original track, the deviation had not cost any significant extra time, and his old battleships were making a good pace. What...

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