Ideal Embodiment: Kant's Theory of Sensibility

Preface

in whichever way the reader will judge this book, and whether or not it will challenge or stimulate, the ideas presented here have changed my way of looking at Kant’s philosophy and at the historical transition from the early modern period to Kant and, successively, to German Idealism. Furthermore, they have disclosed the possibility of considering classical philosophical problems in a fresh perspective, and offered the opportunity to engage with contemporary philosophical discussions from a new angle. In writing this preface I find myself thinking more about the exciting future projects to which the work for this book has been leading me, than about the process of writing it. Thus, instead of presenting this volume by telling the story of where it has come from, I shall briefly outline the directions in which Kant’s transcendental philosophy—as it emerges from the reconstruction in this book—is bringing me. In other words, I shall tentatively look at the future rather than the past. With this I also express the desire that the work be judged not only for what it directly contributes to Kant scholarship and interpretation, but also for what it brings—indirectly, to be sure, and by way of suggestion—to the endeavor to think with Kant on some important philosophical issues of the present. I consider this book to be the first part of a larger investigation on the idea of “sensibility” (Sinnlichkeit) in Kant’s philosophy. While I here advance the interpretive concept of “transcendental embodiment” as key for a new reading of the three Critiques, this same concept is now leading me to the further question of the relationship between Kant’s “critical” philosophy and his “applied” philosophy. What role does “transcendental embodiment” Preface viii preface play in this transition? In particular, how shall the Anthropology, the Metaphysics of Morals, and even the Opus Postumum be read in light of the interpretation of sensibility given in this book? As mentioned above, thinking of the three Critiques in terms of “transcendental embodiment” has led me to view many of the current philosophical proposals—in both the “analytic” and “Continental” camps—in a new perspective. In particular, I have started to notice the presence of Kant’s “ghost” in places where contemporary authors claim to be farthest from what they consider to be the flaws of Kantian transcendentalism. By contrast, it also seems to me that what they propose is not so distant from what, I suggest, Kant himself has offered in the Critiques. What can we make, then, of this curious predicament: Kant anticipating, unnoticed, his own overcoming in twentieth- and twenty-first-century philosophy? Finally, the reflection on the idea of “transcendental embodiment” has re-oriented my own interpretation of the immediate post-Kantian debate that leads to Hegel. Here a methodological issue or alternative arises: transcendental philosophy or dialectic? What is the philosophical approach that allows us to come closer to an understanding of the human body? How does Kant’s own critical solution of the soul-body problem influence Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel? And how are Herder and Schiller, for example, positioned in this debate? I am grateful to the many friends and colleagues who have nourished this work over the years. I would like to single out Manfred Baum, Dan Breazeale, George Di Giovanni, Hans Friedrich Fulda, Gianna Gigliotti, David Kolb, David F. Krell, Adriaan Peperzak, and Tom Rockmore for thanks—first for the ongoing discussions, comments, and criticisms that have challenged and stimulated my work, and then for the precious lessons they have taught me with their own work. I am particularly grateful to Tom Rockmore and David F. Krell for having believed in this project over the years and supported it through all its phases; and to John Sallis for accepting the book in the Studies in Continental Thought series. Dee Mortensen has been a wonderful editor—patient, generous, and always helpful. The support of various institutions has allowed me to concentrate on the research for this book and on its writing. I have benefited from: a grant of the CUNY Research Foundation (2003–2004), a Giles Whiting Foundation Fellowship at Brooklyn College (2004), an Alexander von Humboldt Fellowship (2004–2005), and release time from Brooklyn College (2007). preface ix I hope this will be yet another surprise for Aurora. To her this book is dedicated. She has made my reflection on time and space “real.” But...