South Asian Cultures of the Bomb: Atomic Publics and the State in India and Pakistan

9. Nuclearization and Pakistani Popular Culture since 1998

9 Nuclearization and Pakistani Popular Culture since 1998 Iftikhar Dadi Figure 9.1. Lapel pins, the top three bear the text “CRUSH INDIA,” the middle top lapel also bears the text “GORI MEZILE [sic].” ca. 1998. Figure 9.2. Nationalist medals. The bottom two medals show Altaf Hussain, leader of the MQM party (left), and Jinnah paired with a missile (right). ca. 1998. Figure 9.3. Buttons. The top left button shows Nawaz Sharif, Dr. A. Q. Khan, the “father” of the Pakistani bomb, and a mushroom cloud with the Pakistani flag emerging. ca. 1998. Figure 9.4. Paper hat. Text includes “Atomic Blasts mubarak,” “Independence Day mubarak,” with a mushroom cloud decorated with the Pakistani flag, framed by the Ghauri and the Shaheen missiles. ca. 1998. Figure 9.5. Button. Shows Dr. A. Q. Khan, the “father” of the Pakistani bomb, with Jinnah, Iqbal, and Liaquat Ali, framed by the Ghauri and the Shaheen missiles. ca. 1998. Figure 9.6a–c. “Samsonite” bag with camouflage design. The patterns on this remarkable bag are not composed of organic shapes but of military images and texts including “FAUJIMAN,” “ISLAMIC BOMB,” “WINNER-65 WAR,” “MOST WANTED.” 24 × 16 × 18 inches, nylon. ca. 1998. Figure 9.6b. Figure 9.6c. Figure 9.7. Missile-shaped lapel pins. ca. 1998. Figure 9.8. Missile-shaped lapel pin, “Ghauri missile.” ca. 1998. Figure 9.9. Poster, General Zia-ul-Haq with other nationalist leaders, Jinnah, Iqbal, Liaquat Ali, Ayub Khan, framed with heroic images of the Pakistan Army. ca. 1988–90, 19 × 13 inches. Figure 9.10. Poster, Benazir Bhutto with her father, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, with the words “Kashmir is ours” and “We will fight for a thousand years for Kashmir.” ca. early 1990s, 12 × 18 inches. Figure 9.11. Billboard, Benazir Bhutto framed by portraits of war heroes, Karachi. ca. mid1990s . Figure 9.12. Anonymous inset in the “Social Roundup” pages of Akhbar-i Jahan, June 29–July 4, 1998, p. 59. Titled “Atomic Capabilities—We ought to humbly prostrate ourselves in thanks to the Almighty,” the inset critiques the Pasban’s glorification of belligerent nuclearization. 184 · Nuclearization and Pakistani Popular Culture since 1998 Figure 9.13. Chagai Hills monument in a public park, Islamabad, 2006 [?]. Photographer unknown. Introduction This essay discusses how nuclearization in Pakistani public space was manifested by discursive constructs and material artifacts, and argues for a structural and thematic continuity between the pre- and post-nuclear eras by looking at nationalist and military representations produced in Pakistan before and after the 1998 atomic tests. The emphasis, however, is on the enactment of a new nuclear popular public in Pakistan, which the state attempts to appropriate by creating grandiose monuments celebrating nuclearization. Practices both by the state and non-state actors in visualizing nuclearization have created an important popular and political arena for a paradoxical, spectral debate on nuclearization. This essay briefly examines this period and its aftermath through the lens of popular culture, arguing that developments in the wake of the 1998 tests also rendered the question of nuclearization in Pakistan to discursive and popular visibility, and to unfolding effects in the public sphere that cannot be predicted. To convey the character of this debate firsthand, I rely on extensive quotations from Iftikhar Dadi · 185 commentators and actors, as well as on reproductions of the rich range of material artifacts produced since 1998. Economic and Political Context in 1998 Pakistan conducted its nuclear tests at a time when the Nawaz Sharif–led government was facing persistent crises—allegations of corruption and nepotism, ethnic violence in Karachi, and difficulties meeting outside financial commitments. The Indian nuclear tests of May 11 and 13, 1998, were widely perceived in Pakistan to have forced the Pakistani government to conduct reciprocal tests as early as possible, and these were carried out on May 28 and 30 after a suspenseful seventeen days. Although the Pakistani government’s intention to conduct the tests enjoyed widespread public support after May 11, this sentiment was not universal, even within the government itself.1 Samina Ahmed has argued that the pressure the unanticipated Indian tests exerted upon the Pakistani public produced “one positive development,” which was to open up public debate...