Tirpitz and the Imperial German Navy

17. Conclusion

444 Tirpitz entered the navy in 1865 as a gangly adolescent. From the outset he showed elements of the intelligence, diligence, and sheer determination that marked his entire career. His father, jokingly but prophetically, predicted he would be a Grand Admiral. As he matured into a junior officer and suffered the frustrating experience of serving through two wars without firing a shot, he demonstrated a talent, rare among his contemporaries , for working out on paper ideas that were logical, empirical, and creative. This talent attracted the attention of both peers and superiors and helped him obtain enviable career assignments, first (1877) as a junior officer in the mint-new Torpedo Arm, and later (1892) as Chief of Staff of the Oberkommando. Except for royalty, there was no early promotion within the navy’s iron-hard seniority system, and he was never promoted ahead of his own seniority (fifth within the “crew” of 1865). Luck, too, played a role, even before he entered the navy. When the training ship Amazone sank with all hands in 1861, six senior officers and nineteen ensigns and sea cadets were among the crew, and each would have preceded him on the seniority list. Good fortune also spared him from the accidents and exposure to disease that cut short many careers. A lifelong hypochondriac, in 1876 he dreaded a posting to China. When he briefly went to China in 1896–97 he did become ill. Instead of service abroad, in 1877 he was assigned to the Torpedo Arm. He served there for twelve years with an unusual degree of autonomy and rose from Lt. Commander to Captain, with increasing levels of responsibility, taking a giant step toward the creation of a formidable reputation. Like most successful officers in any navy, Tirpitz had a gift for cultivating his superiors. Rear Admiral Carl Batsch, in 1876 Chief of Staff of 17 Conclusion Conclusion 445 the Admiralty, very likely chose him to enter the recently founded Torpedo Arm. While there, Tirpitz’s driving energy and leadership qualities won him the merited patronage of Stosch and Caprivi, the two soldiers who led the navy between 1873 and 1888. Later, despite Tirpitz’s prickly personality, Senden and William II advanced his career in the Oberkommando and the RMA. While at the Torpedo Arm he attracted and trained some of the most capable young naval officers. Many of them followed him into the Oberkommando and the RMA. This group, the “Torpedo Gang,” is documented in detail for the first time in this work (see the appendix). The group became a cadre that Tirpitz could mobilize in official and unofficial ways during his many power struggles within the navy. Some, such as Ahlefeld, Dähnhardt, Heeringen, and Hopmann, remained consistently loyal to him; others, such as Fischel, Pohl, and Müller, became his adversaries after about 1908. The role of the Torpedo Gang, and cadre formation in the navy more generally, deserve more attention than they have so far received from historians.1 Carl-Axel Gemzell has addressed this question but solely in the realm of strategic planning. What made Tirpitz such a major figure in the history of Wilhelmian Germany? Strategy and Geography The risk theory and its flaws (see chapter 10) need not be recapitulated here. If it was sincerely meant, it was a disastrous conception. Its premises were demolished with the formation of the Triple Entente. By 1914 German isolation was so complete that the High Seas Fleet, despite Tirpitz’s Herculean efforts, was nearly as inferior to the Allied fleets as the German fleet had been to the Royal Navy in 1898. Numbers alone do not tell the whole story. If one ignores the role of Tirpitz’s policies in tying Britain to France, in some respects Germany’s naval position had improved considerably since 1898. Assuming that the German Army would have invaded Belgium in a war against France, and that Britain would have fought Germany anyway, Tirpitz’s policy was a limited success. Marder details his view of what would likely have been the results of a decisive British victory at Jutland. He therefore inadvertently points out what the naval situation might have been if Germany had fought the Entente without a 446 Tirpitz and the Imperial German Navy respectable fleet.2 A negligible German fleet would have allowed British light forces to penetrate Helgoland Bight and seal up German U-boats. The Royal Navy...