Tirpitz and the Imperial German Navy

16. Uncommon Recessional, 1916–1930

410 Reluctant Retiree Tirpitz, upon leaving the RMA, moved from his grand official residence with his wife Marie and daughter Margot to a large flat in Berlin at von der Heydt Strasse 15. His salary as State Secretary had been 45,000 marks, plus 15,000 for office expenses. His pension would be half his salary (22,500 marks).1 His family’s financial situation appeared reasonably secure. The status of his holdings in Alghero, Sardinia, San Remo on the Italian Riviera, and a Paris apartment was uncertain. He also had invested a substantial amount in war bonds,2 and he retained the house at St. Blasien. Tirpitz’s son, Wolfgang, was a prisoner of war in Britain and was later interned in Holland. Ulrich von Hassell, the husband of daughter Ilse, slowly recovered from the bullet in the heart he had received at the Marne in 1914. His convalescence took place at the Tirpitz home. Unable to resume his diplomatic career for health reasons, in January 1916 he took an administrative position for the government of Prussia at Stettin.3 From then on Hassell served Tirpitz as a political agent and surrogate in dealing with nationalist opposition figures, particularly Wolfgang Kapp.4 After his resignation Tirpitz was inundated with letters, telegrams, and newspaper columns from hundreds of well-wishers.5 The British, who, along with most Germans, mistakenly believed that Tirpitz had played a major role in the naval war, were completely baffled by his departure , and even suspected that it was a diabolical trick. On 19 March Admiral Eduard von Capelle came out of retirement to become State Secretary. Tirpitz later learned, to his chagrin, that Capelle had quietly accepted Bethmann’s U-boat policy.6 The very fact of 16 Uncommon Recessional, 1916–1930 Uncommon Recessional, 1916–1930 411 Capelle’s selection should have made that obvious. Michaelis, who joined the RMA just before Tirpitz’s departure, noted that Tirpitz felt Capelle had campaigned for the post. Their decades-long friendship was shattered . Thereafter Tirpitz worked to diminish Capelle’s reputation within the navy.7 Tirpitz’s resentment is probably why, in his memoirs, he minimized Capelle’s contributions to the navy. After his dismissal Tirpitz was exhausted and dispirited. On 29 March he wrote to Trotha: “My nature and thought are foreign to those who now rule Germany. . . . After my departure, the official circle is completely closed.” He noted Capelle’s admission in the Budget Commission that unrestricted U-boat warfare could not force the British to peace within six months.8 For the moment Tirpitz himself remained passive, although his allies continued to agitate, within the limits of the wartime censorship laws, for more vigorous U-boat warfare. Despite his discomfort with Capelle, he visited the RMA occasionally . He retained support at court from the Crown Prince and the Empress . The active officer to whom he was closest was Trotha, by then Scheer’s Chief of Staff. Trotha, who had worked in the MK before the war, still enjoyed a friendly relationship with Müller. Although cut off from genuine influence, Tirpitz tried, through a letter to William II, to affect the U-boat debate and the diplomacy of the war.9 He argued that keeping Flanders would undermine the British in the long run, while a robust U-boat war would threaten them in the shorter run. Two main British war goals were to prevent those eventualities . He conceded that “the [economic] connection [between Britain and the United States] is so close that America has a direct interest in the victory of England.” American threats about the U-boat war were blackmail . He argued that the more Germany acquiesced, the more American demands would escalate. He even rhetorically asserted that if Germany doubted that the U-boat war could achieve a decisive victory over England , it should completely abandon the U-boat war on commerce, a policy that would be better than the half-measures then in progress, which annoyed the United States as much as an unrestricted campaign. The only way a dilatory campaign would make sense would be in the context of an attempt to achieve an understanding with Russia, an idea Tirpitz had favored since the beginning of the war. He concluded with a passionate appeal that now was the time to launch an unrestricted U-boat war, 412 Tirpitz and the Imperial German Navy “which would be a...