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375 Geographic and Material Prelude The central theater of the naval war was the North Sea. The north–south orientation of the island of Great Britain was a barrier that made the North Sea a virtual cul de sac. Germany only had access to the open ocean either to the south, through the narrow English Channel, or to the north. At its southern end, where the English Channel begins, less than 30 nautical miles separate Dover from Calais. The North Sea extends north about 700 miles, along the coast of England and Scotland, to the Shetland Islands. About 200 miles east of the Shetlands is the great Norwegian coastal archipelago, inside of which is the old Hanseatic port of Bergen. From Bergen, 400 miles south and slightly east, was the fortified island of Helgoland, 50 miles north of the Jade Bay, and Wilhelmshaven, the home of the High Seas Fleet. From there, initially skirting the Dutch coast, another 300 miles southwest, is Dover and the English Channel. At the northwest corner of the North Sea, in the Orkney Islands, is Scapa Flow, the principal base of the British Grand Fleet. From there, 600 miles away, almost exactly southeast of Scapa, is Wilhelmshaven. The route between the two forms a diagonal that neatly bisects the North Sea. Besides the geography of the North Sea, an important factor limiting choices, particularly for Britain, was the port situation. The best British naval facilities, ideal for past wars with France, were at Plymouth and Portsmouth on the south coast. Looking north from the Thames estuary, Harwich was suited only to light forces. Rosyth and Cromarty were, at the beginning of the war, insufficiently developed and open to submarine at15 Tirpitz at War, August 1914–March 1916 376 Tirpitz and the Imperial German Navy tack; nor were they large enough to accommodate the Grand Fleet. That left only Scapa Flow in the Orkneys, relatively exposed to the rigors of the North Atlantic. Just an anchorage at first, it had no direct access to rail communications. Only the decision, made in July 1914, to undertake a distant blockade made it a feasible choice. Although Germany had a North Sea coastline of only about 100 miles, it had a highly developed array of commercial ports. The greatest was Hamburg, well inland on the Elbe. Cuxhaven and Bremen, and Bremerhaven on the Weser, were important trade entrepots. The western terminus of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal entered the Elbe downstream from Hamburg. The naval base of Wilhelmshaven, a fenland in the 1860s, was, by 1914, well connected to the efficient German rail network. The problem with Wilhelmshaven was that shoals and sandbars in the Jade required two high tides for the whole fleet to get to sea. This fact limited quick deployment. Geography also limited the fleet’s ability to mount a major attack on the vital cross-channel movement of troops and supplies to France. If the High Seas Fleet sailed the 350 miles to the Channel, it would run the huge risk that the numerically superior Grand Fleet, steaming quickly from the north, might cut it off from its base. Such a raid would probably be futile anyway, because the Channel was narrow enough so that threatened merchantmen could scurry back into port before any attack. The greatest hazard to both fleets in the North Sea was the danger, in such shallow and narrow seas, of minefields and submarine attacks. This risk would increase continuously as the war went on. At the outset of the war Britain possessed twenty-two Dreadnought battleships plus two more Turkish-owned ships requisitioned from British yards in August 1914. Germany had thirteen, with four more (the König class) completed by November 1914, although they would still have to undergo trials. Britain had nine battlecruisers, with Tiger completed in October 1914. Germany had four battlecruisers, with Derfflinger completed in September 1914. Goeben had other business in the Mediterranean. By British standards, German ships were undergunned (11- and 12-inch guns vs. 12-, 13.5-, and 15-inch guns) and were a knot or two slower. German ships excelled in the thickness and quality of their armor and in their unmatched watertight integrity, but these advantages were obvious neither to friend nor foe until battle was actually joined. German Dreadnoughts, built specifically for North Sea battles, had shorter range. Britain had a [3.137.185.180] Project MUSE (2024-04-26 15:14 GMT) Tirpitz at War, August 1914–March 1916 377...

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