Tirpitz and the Imperial German Navy

14. Denouement, 1911–1914

323 The Second Moroccan Crisis The explosive events of the summer and early fall of 1911 were triggered by an innocent and routine ship redeployment. The gunboat Panther, Southwest African station ship, was due to return to Wilhelmshaven for major repairs. Chief of the Admiralstab, Fischel, on 8 March 1911, asked the Foreign Office if there were any objections if Panther stopped in a Moroccan port on its way home in July. The French, in violation of the Algeciras Act of 1906, occupied the Moroccan capital of Fez on 21 May. Foreign Secretary Kiderlen-Wächter agreed to allow Panther to visit the port of Mogador.1 Late in June Bethmann and Kiderlen decided to challenge the French occupation of Morocco. A handy excuse was to protect hypothetically endangered German nationals in Agadir. The Emperor reluctantly consented, though nervous that it might spoil his upcoming visit to London. Since all the principals were at Kiel Week, Kiderlen called in Heeringen, the new Chief of the Admiralstab, to prepare the necessary orders without clarifying the political context. Heeringen told Michaelis that the Emperor had ordered the immediate dispatch of Panther to Agadir . Michaelis asked why the initiative, to which Heeringen replied: “To hoist the flag.” Michaelis responded: “The little ship is too weak to make a difference, and, by raising their flag at Fez, the French have declared that Morocco is in their sphere.” Heeringen answered: “It is not supposed to conquer Morocco but only to show that we are there, too. As Kiderlen says, it should be a trumpet blast with which we will get compensation 14 Denouement, 1911–1914 324 Tirpitz and the Imperial German Navy from the French elsewhere.”2 Neither Tirpitz nor the Fleet Chief was officially informed. Hopmann wrote that Tirpitz, had he been consulted, would have strongly advised against the incursion. “During his entire time in office, he was no friend of fanfare, especially any directed against England that threatened to disrupt his life’s work.”3 Hopmann was only partly right; for when a Novelle was pending Tirpitz did not hesitate to play the antiBritish propaganda card. At other times he tried to lay low. But in the spring and early summer of 1911 Tirpitz was pessimistic about the prospective Novelle to raise the impending two tempo. and so, as the Moroccan Crisis played itself out, he began to see it as a heaven-sent opportunity for expansion, akin to the Bundesrath affair of 1900. The Second Moroccan Crisis originated in the Franco-German rivalry there, but it ended, as in 1906, with a major confrontation between Britain and Germany.4 Since 1909 the French had substantially exceeded the special rights granted them in the 1906 Act of Algeciras. The resulting insurrection prompted the French, in 1911, to send a force to Fez. German protests to Paris went unheeded. Kiderlen and Bethmann felt that quick action was necessary to address the “affront.” The most realistic possibility , in their view, was to concede the French position there in exchange for compensation elsewhere. The Emperor consented, and on 20 June 1911 Kiderlen informed the French of this decision. In this context Panther arrived in Agadir on 1 July, creating consternation in Paris and London. Although German interests there were almost nil and in no jeopardy, Kiderlen, to rationalize the incursion, invoked hackneyed phrases about the defense of German lives and property; his real reason, however, was to rattle a saber at the French to improve Germany’s bargaining position. This recklessness provoked a furor in Britain and counterpoint nationalist agitation in Germany. Kiderlen did not inform the navy of the political reasons for dispatching Panther.5 When Tirpitz heard of it later he recognized it as a grave political and tactical blunder, especially since the British had not been informed ahead of time. The unnecessary secrecy is a good example of the chaotic manner in which Germany conducted policy. Tirpitz received unofficial word of the Panther decision just as he was departing for summer leave, and, in his memoirs, he remarked: “A flag is easily hoisted, but it is often a difficult matter to lower even a small one with honor.”6 Denouement, 1911–1914 325 Foreign Secretary Grey warned, on 3 July, of British interest in the matter. Kiderlen compounded the error by a three-week delay in clarifying his position.7 The British Conservative press loudly denounced Kiderlen’s policy as an...