Tirpitz and the Imperial German Navy

7. Oberkommando der Marine, 1892–1895

81 The “Fog of Peace” When Tirpitz became Chief of Staff to Admiral Max von der Goltz, Commanding Admiral in the Oberkommando der Marine (OK), it was a time of critical uncertainty within all the world’s navies. A generation had passed since the last great naval battle, and a “fog of peace” had descended , analogous to Clausewitz’s famous expression, the “fog of war.”1 By the end of the 1880s confusion reigned in most of the world’s navies about virtually all major strategic, tactical, and technological questions . The last great naval battle had been the Austrian victory over the Italians at Lissa in 1866. It was fought by a potpourri of wooden ships and ironclads, under both sail and steam, using not just artillery but also ramming , a tactic that dated from classical times. Austrian Admiral Wilhelm von Tegetthoff had used a triple line abreast V formation to slam perpendicularly into a larger and more modern Italian fleet that was in line ahead. Execrable Italian leadership complicated any rational analysis of the battle, and it provided only a muddled guide for future development.2 During the long maritime peace after Lissa, technology changed in kaleidoscopic fashion. Experimentation took place to a degree unprecedented in naval history. Some ships, such as the small German coastal defense battleships of the Siegfried class, were obsolete before they were completed.3 By 1890, to the regret of many older officers who saw reefing sails in a gale as the ultimate test of manhood, a consensus had at last emerged that warships should shed their sails. During the 1880s, except for the Italians, who built ever larger battleships , European navies, under the influence of the French Jeune École, 7 Oberkommando der Marine, 1892–1895 82 Tirpitz and the Imperial German Navy slowed down construction of armored battleships, whose dominance appeared threatened by gnat-like swarms of cheap and swift torpedo boats. Manufacturers experimented with ever thicker armor competing with ever more powerful artillery. Would future wars be fought in the traditional way by large battleships, albeit now armored and steam-powered, or by cruisers and torpedo boats engaging in commerce raiding on the enemy, as the French Jeune École insisted? With no war to test the various hypotheses, the experts differed in their opinions.4 The “fog of peace” also affected the Imperial German Navy. Humiliated by its passivity and ineffectiveness in the Franco-Prussian War, the navy longed to emerge from the army’s dominant shadow.5 The accession of twenty-nine-year old William II in 1888 seemed to promise better times for the navy. Son of the eldest daughter of Queen Victoria, he had repeatedly asserted his intention to do for the navy what his grandfather William I had done for the army;6 nevertheless, from the very beginning, the Emperor’s interest was a mixed blessing for the navy.7 His enthusiasm was welcome, but his belief in his own expertise in naval matters created no end of problems. For the first nine years of his reign, he wavered between a battleship and a cruiser navy. He could change his mind from one to the other virtually overnight.8 In 1889 he divided the navy into three parts to safeguard his power of command (Kommandogewalt) in the navy, exercised through the OK, against the possible meddling of parliamentarians, with whom Hollmann and the RMA had to deal. In this way William II could entertain the illusion , which he took all too seriously to suit his admirals, that he, personally , commanded the navy.9 There were strategic questions as well. If naval war ever came, who would be the enemy? France? Russia? Denmark? Or would it be some combination of the three? In the wake of Bismarck’s dismissal in 1890 the looming Franco-Russian alliance made the question urgent. In those innocent days, not the slightest thought was given to the absurd proposition of a naval war with Britain. Should the navy emphasize immediate preparedness, always expecting a war “next spring,” which was Caprivi’s strategy (1883–1888)? This policy would favor torpedo boats, which could be constructed quickly. Or should larger ships, which required years to build, be ordered for future fleets? Should the fleet be scattered among Germany’s ports and designed Oberkommando der Marine, 1892–1895 83 strictly for coastal defense; or should it be concentrated in one place for battle on the...