The European Union Explained: Institutions, Actors, Global Impact

9. Checks and Balances

9 Checks and Balances Checks on the European Court of Justice Once in place, a court should be able to rule and act as independently as possible in interpreting and applying law. Throughout its existence, ECJ judges in Luxembourg enjoyed a quiet existence outside the political limelight of Brussels. Granted, legal wrangles have occurred with national supreme courts that often criticized the establishment of a superior European legal order by the ECJ’s case law, but, from an institutional perspective, no political player in the EU has ever questioned the authority of the ECJ. Given that every member state has to appoint one judge, one could assume that rulings tend to be in line with the national background of the judges. But, as already pointed out, past experience yields the overwhelming impression that judges do not vote in line with any political objectives of their member state governments. The ECJ, therefore, can be described as a beacon of judicial independence, and, as such, it reflects great credit to the European project. 10-EUE Ch9 (75-80).indd 75 9/24/08 9:11:06 AM 76 · Institutions Checks on the European Parliament As in any democratic system, the parliament is controlled by the citizens who vote the parliamentarians into power. As mentioned above, elections to the EP tend to have a much lower turnout than national elections, often producing different majorities than, for instance, an election to a national parliament would. This inconsistency and unpredictability might not be welcomed by the political elite, but it represents a vital form of direct democracy in a European Union which evidently prefers that EU officials are appointed by national governments rather than by direct public elections. The office of the Commission President is a good illustration of this point. More worrisome, however, are the low voter turnouts; this obviously suggests that the public has little political interest in EU affairs, which certainly undermines the public’s influence over the one organization designed to represent the values and standards of the European citizen. As previously mentioned, another hindrance to the performance of the EP is the organizational problems, most notably France’s persistence to keep the EP, at least partially, in Strasbourg. A complete relocation to Brussels would certainly improve the political effectiveness of the EP, but such a move would require unanimous agreement within the European Council. A further problem is that the legislative power of the EP depends on the type of policy that is affected by a legislative proposal. In certain initiatives, such as judicial and police cooperation in criminal and civil matters, the EP is completely excluded from the legislative process. In other areas, such as EMU, the consultation procedure that is applied falls short of any decent democratic system. On such vital matters, the representative organ of the citizens ought to be included more fully in the legislative process. On the other hand, some analysts argue that citizens are indeed represented, although only indirectly, as it is the Council of Ministers that can put its mark on legislation. Individual national ministers, after all, assumed their positions through proper democratic elections. But, following this argument to its logical conclusion, the EP’s entire raison d’être could come into question. What is the point of a European Parliament with insufficient powers ? Would it not be better to abolish the EP completely, and let national parliaments assume supervisory and legislative functions? At any rate, the European Parliament can have its powers increased only through a treaty change, which happened, for instance, at Maastricht when the co-decision procedure was introduced . But the final wording and approval of a treaty change is undertaken by the European Council, and would twenty-seven heads of government want to increase the powers of the very organization that is supposed to keep them in check on behalf of European citizens? 10-EUE Ch9 (75-80).indd 76 9/24/08 9:11:06 AM Checks and Balances · 77 Table 9.1. The Comitology System Type of Procedure Interplay Council/Commission Policy Fields Advisory Procedure Commission free to act Competition, mergers, state aids Management Procedure Commission can enact measures unless the Committee opposes the measures with QMV Agriculture Regulatory Procedure. Commission can enact measures only if the Committee supports the measures by QMV customs and tariffs, veterinary and plant health, food safety issues Safeguard Procedure Commission has to secure prior agreement from the Council trade...