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7. Character and Conduct: Dewey and the Great Divide in Ethics
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∞≤Ω s e v e n Character and Conduct Dewey and the Great Divide in Ethics One important consequence of the resurgence of virtue ethics is a more comprehensive way to classify ethical theories than the usual choice between deontological and consequentialist views. It has been assumed that the great divide in ethics is between act-centered views, ethics of doing, and character-centered views, ethics of being;∞ in other words, morality should be conceived as a matter of doing good or being good. (I hereafter use the expression ‘‘the divide issue’’ to describe this issue.) Though this seems like an issue that has been recognized only in contemporary ethics, John Dewey anticipated it and evaluated its legitimacy. Dewey undermines the grounds for the divide issue, and he proposes a way to move beyond the debates between character-centered and act-centered ethics, by having a di√erent starting point and metaphysics for his ethics. An examination of this contemporary issue will reveal how inclusive but radical Dewey’s view of moral life were, and spotlight his contemporary relevance. William Frankena explains the divide issue as ‘‘To be or to do, that is the question. Should we construe morality as primarily a following of certain principles or as primarily a cultivation of certain dispositions or d e w e y ’ s v i e w o f m o r a l e x p e r i e n c e ∞≥≠ traits?’’≤ To answer this question philosophers have turned to two other questions: (A) what is central to moral discourse, evaluation and justification ? and, (B) what is the primary concern or end of moral activity? If the answers to (A) and (B) are that the moral self is primarily concerned with what sort of person she ought to be, and that character considerations are the primary source of moral justification in moral discourse, then moral life is character-centered. This stands in contrast to act-centered views where the primary concern and source of moral justification is the moral rightness or goodness of our conduct. Let’s examine the basis of this debate. Moral Discourse as the Basis for the Divide Issue Character-relevant discourse is about judgments of virtues and features of the agent such as one’s ideals, dispositions, and motives. On the other hand, conduct-relevant discourse is identified with moral judgments of conduct based on features of the act, such as furthering certain ends or complying with certain rules. On the basis of these two sorts of discourse the divide issue admits of two di√erent formulations. The first assumes the independence of each sort of discourse to the other or, in other words, the autonomy of each. It then raises the question: which sort of discourse represents the distinctively moral concern? The second formulation of the issue assumes that both sorts of discourse are genuinely moral but that, therefore, one must be more basic in some manner to the other. As I explain below, Dewey rejects both of these approaches. the autonomy claim Dewey believed that both Kant and Mill based their ethical views on the di√erences and divergences between judgments of character and judgments of conduct in situations. Mill claims that one can get the same objective good act from di√erent motives, even from bad ones. On the other hand, Kant believes that the goodness of a good will does not depend on the rightness of its actions. In general, the act theorist would argue that, for example, an act can be judged dishonest or wrongful even if it is performed by a person of honest character. Therefore, character has nothing to do with morality. Meanwhile, the virtue theorist claims that virtues, such as honesty, are independent of and cannot be reduced to judgments or rules of good conduct. Dewey of course acknowledged that there are times when we invert our judgments of the doer and the deed, for example, an honest person [3.81.79.135] Project MUSE (2024-03-28 12:54 GMT) c h a r a c t e r a n d c o n d u c t ∞≥∞ can do a dishonest act. But the only way a philosopher can establish that the moral goodness of a trait of character is somehow independent of the assessment of the activities of that person is if she stipulates a narrow definition of human action. For example, only if it is assumed that honesty...