If Mahan Ran the Great Pacific War: An Analysis of World War II Naval Strategy

3. Pearl Harbor

3 PEARL HARBOR In 1948, Admiral Morison summed up the impact of the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor: “One can search military history in vain for an operation more fatal to the aggressor. On the tactical level, the Pearl Harbor attack wrongly concentrated on ships rather than on permanent installations and oil tanks. On the strategic level it was idiotic. On the high political level it was disastrous.”1 Sixty years later, nothing needs to be added. Yamamoto’s plan, while tactically audacious, was a strategic disaster. At the operational level, it was not bold enough to achieve the objective of crippling the American fleet. Mahan would have agreed that Yamamoto identified the most critical objective, the American battle fleet. But the admiral neither concentrated sufficient combat power nor created a plan that, successfully executed, would have achieved the objective. the inveterate gambler plunked down a large bet. He should have placed even more chips on the opening throw. At the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, Admiral Husband e. Kimmel commanded the U.S. Pacific fleet. One of his prewar plans officers stated, “I thought it would be utterly stupid for the Japanese to attack the United States at Pearl Harbor. . . . I did not believe we could move the United States fleet to the western Pacific until such time as the material condition of the ships was improved.”2 the surprise of the Pearl Harbor attack was one of its main attributes. never again would the Japanese find the Americans as stunned as they were on December 7, 1941. But a knockout blow was needed. Yamamoto planned only a sharp slap. Japan’s national strategy contained two objectives. first, seize the riches of the South Seas, especially oil. Second, eliminate the only force that could threaten this new prize—the U.S. Pacific fleet. captain Mahan’s advice would have been uncompromising: focus everything on the enemy fleet. Once it is destroyed, all else will be there for the taking. this was the essence of Mahan on war-fighting strategy. Despite all their study, the Japanese naval leadership had not learned Mahan’s lesson. Japanese naval strategists placed far more emphasis on the South Seas operation . An even greater error squandered resources on secondary objectives like the Philippines. Had those resources been focused on Mahan’s prime objective, the enemy’s fleet, Japanese success in the initial period of the war would have lasted far longer. that was Japan’s best bet for a negotiated peace. Command Problems and Strike Planning against the American Fleet At the turn of the century, during the russo-Japanese war, Admiral togo slaughtered the russian Baltic fleet as it steamed to relieve what remained of the russian Pacific squadron, which had already suffered a Japanese sneak attack. He patiently waited while the russians sailed halfway around the globe and then ambushed them in the tsushima Strait. ensign Yamamoto lost two fingers during this battle. while American naval officers gathered each year at the naval war college to war-game Plan Orange, their Japanese counterparts were also preparing for their own great Pacific war. Japanese planners understood the logic that underpinned Plan Orange without ever seeing a copy. they assumed the Americans would assemble a great fleet and sail to relieve the Philippines if Japan invaded or threatened it. In the tradition of tsushima, they planned to ambush the advancing If MAHAn rAn tHe greAt PAcIfIc wAr 62 American fleet as it traversed the Japanese Mandated Islands. Initially, torpedo boats, submarines, and destroyers would attrit the advancing Americans. At a point chosen by the emperor’s admirals, the Imperial fleet could crush the Americans in a decisive fleet engagement. to this end, Japan might first invade or threaten the Philippines to draw the American fleet west to its doom. By 1940, it was apparent that an attack on the Philippines would not immediately lure the American fleet into another tsushima. the American advance would be no rush. Instead the Americans would assemble sufficient strength from both its Atlantic and Pacific fleets to crush the smaller Japanese fleet. Prewar naval tacticians had estimated that a 1.5:1 superiority in combat power would assure victory in a fleet engagement.3 this much power provided the edge first to suppress enemy firepower and then to concentrate your own hitting power against enemy...