If Mahan Ran the Great Pacific War: An Analysis of World War II Naval Strategy

13. B-San

13 B-SAN The first ones looked to some Japanese like small silver sailing toys hanging way up in the air. Somehow they were beautiful as they crawled across the sky 30,000 feet above the ground. Another of America’s scientific achievements; a technological marvel. Many Japanese used the honorific and referred to them as “Bsan ”—like Papa-san. Then the bombs began exploding. In 1932, Billy Mitchell predicted the final campaign that was to end World War II. In an article published for Liberty Magazine, “Are We Ready for War with Japan,” he speculated that Japan’s end would come in a strategic bombing campaign prosecuted by bombers with the then fantastic range of 5,000 miles. From bases in either Alaska or Midway, they would pummel the Japanese into submission without the need for invasion.1 Since the first writings of Douhet, the first prophet of aerial bombardment, airpower advocates have extolled the virtues of replacing costly surface battles against the enemy’s most hardened target, his military forces deployed for battle in the field or at sea. Airpower would directly attack the strategic sources of enemy power, and the will of their populations and leaders to continue the fight. The notion of defeating the enemy’s will to resist is as old as organized warfare . general William Tecumseh Sherman practiced it in his March to the Sea through georgia. “I will make war such a hell that southerners will wage it no more.” Following World War I, a collection of captains teaching at the Air corps Tactical School at Maxwell Air Force Base kept the theory of strategic bombing alive. It was elevated to the most central belief of the U.S. Army Air corps. When asked to write a plan to win the war, the air corps produced AWPD1 as a blueprint . First, American airpower would sweep its enemy from the skies. With a path to the enemy’s homeland clear, high-altitude bombers would hit selected “bottleneck” target systems (such as oil and electrical power generation). Without these key industries, the entire economy would break down. The enemy would no longer have the means to carry on modern war. Both FDR and general Marshall were very impressed with this argument. To produce this result, the plan outlined a program of airplane construction, pilot training, and putting into place the infrastructure for the upcoming campaigns . Little attention was given to tactical support of armies or navies. In 1942 many air planners envisioned an air campaign that would defeat hitler without an invasion of the european continent. The idea of precision air bombardment is intriguing. The questions before America’s ranking admirals and generals were, Did the airmen have the technological ability to execute their ideas? What if the machines couldn’t execute the strategy? Then America’s military leaders would have to face the ominous decisions to invade europe and Japan. Aviation’s technical ability to deliver destruction where it could have decisive impact could not meet the requirements of a strategy of precision air bombardment . In 1943 individual bombs created fearful devastation at their point of impact . Unfortunately, they could not be delivered via high-flying multiple-engine bombers with anywhere near the accuracy to strike the critical aim points a strategic campaign against bottlenecks required. The technical solutions were either to vastly increase the destructive power carried in a single sortie or to dramatically increase the accuracy of warhead delivery. The Americans followed the first route with increasingly lethal B-29 armament, first wide-area firebombing , and then with the atom. The Japanese followed the second route by IF MAhAn RAn The gReAT PAcIFIc WAR 400 fielding the first precision-guided munitions in the form of human-guided kamikazes. Anti-air defenses proved far tougher than expected. Radar was a major surprise . Interwar theorists thought bomber raids would seldom be detected in time to launch an effective interceptor force. In fact virtually all raids were detected in time. The lesson is to expect the unknown countermeasure. The most senior commanders have to retain a “gut it out” alternative in the event the wonder weapon isn’t so wonderful. The American Joint chiefs of Staff did this by retaining a credible plan for invasion. They were right in doing so. no one can fault them for comparing the cost in American blood of alternatives to that nightmare. Surface commanders...