If Mahan Ran the Great Pacific War: An Analysis of World War II Naval Strategy

8. Decisive Combat in the Marianas

8 DECISIVE COMBAT IN THE MARIANAS To the Marianas? To Admiral King, the Marianas had long seemed the way to the western Pacific. Their significance could not be impressed upon General Marshall, but after more than a year of discussion Hap Arnold eventually came to see that his B-29 bombers would find roosts in the Marianas to be far more utilitarian than the previously proposed bases in China. With the rapid capture of Kwajalein and Eniwetok, one might have assumed the Marianas were next, but there was a surprising lack of consensus among senior American leaders. Of course MacArthur would object. He had had recent success of his own at Los Negros in the Admiralties, which was virtually undefended . The general quickly reinforced his success by landing troops on the is- land. Now he was in the Admiralties. The Bismarck barrier had been broken. rabaul no longer was a place of bogeymen. King had encountered more serious resistance. Until late in 1943, Truk remained on the list of proposed invasions. Nimitz still was leery of advancing directly to the Marianas.1 His initial plan was to enter the western Marshalls in May and to assault Truk in August. if Truk was bypassed because the Big Blue fleet could neutralize it, Nimitz wanted to go next to Palau. it was as if American planners could leave no fortified Japanese island undisturbed. in late february the Joint Chiefs had not issued definitive instruction as to what came next. A delegation from the southwest Pacific led by General Sutherland and including General Kenney met with Nimitz and most of his senior staff in Pearl Harbor on the morning of 25 January 1944. Before the meeting, Kenney had bunked with Lieutenant General robert C. richardson, the senior army officer in the Pacific Ocean Areas. richardson felt the Pacific war wasn’t progressing rapidly enough. He favored pooling all resources behind one of the two prongs that the Americans had been thrusting across the Pacific. Kenney had always favored this approach. Soon the evening’s discussion centered on the southern advance via New Guinea, the Philippines, formosa, and Japan. Towers and Kenney had been good friends before the war. The day before the formal meeting, the three got together. Towers had always preferred the southern route to an advance across the central Pacific. He told the others that Admirals Sherman and Carney shared their beliefs. All three senior officers agreed that virtually the entire remainder of the proposed central Pacific campaign should be eliminated except for the invasion of Palau, which would protect MacArthur’s northern flank.2 The formal meeting, including Admiral Nimitz and Admiral “Soc” McMorris , began the next morning. Much of the discussion centered on logistical requirements . Vice Admiral W. L. Calhoun, commander of the support group, said a single attack from the south would be the easiest to support. He worried about the infrastructure that would have to be created on the small atolls of the central Pacific. forrest Sherman concurred. Many participants thought the Marianas could be bypassed altogether. Admiral Kinkaid stated that “any talk of the Marianas for a base leaves me entirely cold.”3 Soc McMorris doubted long-range bombers from the Marianas could induce Japan to capitulate. However, he remained an advocate of a central Pacific advance per Plan Orange. forrest Sherman pointed out the limited capacity of central Pacific harbors. Nimitz favored an advance via the Philippines but held that bases on the Chinese mainland would have to be taken and the Home islands bombed before Japan would give in. “The consensus at Pearl Harbor seemed to lean toward a sequence of operations which would place the emphasis of the drive to the Philippines in the if MAHAN rAN THE GrEAT PACifiC WAr 258 Southwest Pacific area.”4 Sutherland and Kenney thought they had won one for MacArthur. That night Sutherland wired MacArthur that Nimitz had been won over to the southwest Pacific approach. However, Nimitz prudently declared that the meeting had been called only to exchange views and it was now over without a formal conclusion being recommended. When King read the minutes of this meeting, he was furious. Sutherland had effectively shut down the central Pacific drive. Nimitz was seen to agree with him. This opened a chasm between Nimitz and King...