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6. Expression and the Origin of Geometry
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6 Expression and the Origin of Geometry We touch here the most difficult point, that is, the bond between the flesh and the idea . . . —Merleau-Ponty1 [M]athematical objects are by their very nature dependent on human thought. They have properties only insofar as these can be discerned in them by thought. . . . Faith in transcendental existence . . . must be rejected as a means of mathematical proof. —Arend Heyting2 1. The Promise of Expression My primary task in the preceding chapters was to articulate the main elements of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of living experience. Even though it is difficult to “know precisely what we see,” Merleau-Ponty attempts to show that living experience emerges through the symbiotic intertwining of one’s own pulsing body, the overflowing, transcendent world of things, and the living bodies of others. Further, he reminds us that experience is sensual, affective , inter-dynamic, and inescapably carnal. Indeed, against intellectual systems and models that suppress, deform, or denigrate these basic truths, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology “says to show” what we actually experience in life. Not mechanistic objects constituting an abstract Newtonian universe, but flesh, organic life, and a natural world. Not clusters of sense-data, but sensually rich things and artifacts: trees and mountains, chairs and buildings. Not solipsism, but complex relations and carnal contact with other creatures. Moreover, we have seen that this phenomenology is not a naïve return to some pre-philosophical immersion in merely private experience. On the contrary: in revealing the derivative character of abstract concepts and models, MerleauPonty ’s phenomenology uncovers reality as we live and share it with others, and endows it with a philosophical status (PP vii). Indeed, for him (as for Heidegger ), phenomenology is ontology. In chapter 1, I also argued that Merleau-Ponty’s project is not rendered obsolete by the astonishing explanatory powers of science. This is because phenomenology speaks for and about qualitative life—an aspect of lived reality Expression and the Origin of Geometry 147 that can never be replaced or exhausted by analytic explanation. Thus, we have seen why so many thinkers continue to be excited by Merleau-Ponty’s thought: it awakens our sensibilities to the living world, enriching the relationships we have there, and in doing so it yields powerful resolutions to a number of traditional metaphysical problems (the mind-body problem, the problem of other minds, dualism, idealism, and so on). In these achievements, despite certain difficulties that I have discussed, Merleau-Ponty offers a phenomenological ontology that keeps us connected with the earth and that is consistent with our everyday experiences and natural history. But there is more, because Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy also seeks to uncover the life of the mind. That is to say, his writings also offer an extremely promising account of thought, language, and knowledge as occurring through a process called expression. I indicated in the introduction that this aspect of his work has received comparatively little attention, even among continental philosophers—an oversight that I think has been deeply problematic. For Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of expression is explicitly offered as an alternative to the dominant western view of these cognitive processes (thinking, language, and knowing) as fundamentally representational. Given the depths and prestige of this tradition, there is a lot at stake in understanding MerleauPonty ’s account of the expressive life of the mind. In this chapter, chapter 7, and the conclusion, my overarching project is to articulate this important yet neglected aspect of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, to explore its consequences, and establish its plausibility. I believe that his account of expression offers a promising new paradigm for understanding our cognitive life within a naturalistic framework, a paradigm that overcomes the well-worn problems of reductive empiricism and dualistic transcendentalism. Further, in studying MerleauPonty ’s expressive theories of thinking, language, and knowledge, we will be able to more fully understand the side of his ontology that he calls “the invisible ,” and its specific relationship to “the visible.” What will emerge, then, by the end of this book is a detailed picture of Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of what he calls “the most difficult point”: the relationship between “the flesh and the idea,” between “eye and mind,” between “the visible and the invisible”—one that escapes and overturns the profound grip of Plato’s “divided line.” Given this overarching plan, my first step is to carefully show what MerleauPonty has in mind when he talks about the process of expression. To do this, I...