In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

The War against North Korea: From Inchon to the Yalu River 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 I find it amazing that highly trained professionals with extensive combat experience could have approved and tried to execute the tactical plan of operations . . . in November 1950. It appears like a pure Map Exercise put on by amateurs, appealing in theory but largely ignoring the reality. Matthew Bunker Ridgway, General (Ret.), 27 February 19851 United Nations forces wore down the North Korea army at the Pusan perimeter before Douglas MacArthur conducted his Inchon landing in mid-September 1950. However, few Americans had grasped the critical condition of the KPA. Truman, always hesitant to be a politician interfering with military operations, now deferred to the general as a genius, particularly when they met at Wake Island three weeks before the congressional election. This was no time for a civilian to dispute a field commander whose prestige was sky-high, even when a “police action” near the border of the Soviet Union and China might escalate into war with a major power—just what the intervention in Korea was supposed to deter. Dean Acheson and George Marshall, on whose counsel Truman strongly relied, had reservations about the military situation. Still, they did not take their concern to the president, for personal as well as political reasons. They too were apt to avoid a confrontation with MacArthur, especially when they 100 ✪ Truman and MacArthur could still hope it might not be necessary. The administration could not really fathom what might motivate China to intercede in North Korea, thought to be a Moscow satellite and hence not vital to Beijing. Washington’s commitment to Formosa, partly a byproduct of MacArthur’s influence, had become a factor, along with Mao’s plan to force the United States to disengage from the Taiwan Strait by crushing its army north of Pyongyang. Inchon: Expectations and Execution I am firmly convinced that early and strong effort behind [the enemy] front will sever his main lines of communication and enable us to deliver a decisive and crushing blow. Douglas MacArthur, 23 July 19502 Matt Ridgway said MacArthur could “cause opposition to melt and doubters to doubt themselves.” The CINCFE actually got his way by mixing persuasion with stealth. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not send him their approval to conduct Inchon until August 29th—and then it was “conditional” upon his delivery of “timely information” about the disposition of the enemy. On September 7th they asked for a new “estimate as to feasibility,” obviously not satisfied with what one officer subsequently called “some slap-dash answer telling them we would make it.” MacArthur dispatched a major who gave a briefing on the 14th, D-Day (Inchon) minus 1, perfect execution of his guidance: Don’t arrive “too soon.” By then, criticism or concurrence was largely academic for what had become a fait accompli. “General MacArthur had a talent for creating good fortune,” the secretary of the army would say.3 The fact that MacArthur could have his way by withholding information indicates that the burden of proof lay on the Joint Chiefs. He did not have to show them that Inchon was right as much as they had to convince him it was wrong. The Pentagon still demurred, and MacArthur wondered who “in Washington lost his nerve? Could it be the President?” No, it was not, despite what MacArthur, still angry a decade after his dismissal, wrote in his memoirs. On August 27th, with the battle at the Pusan perimeter reaching its climax, Frank Lowe wrote the White House confirming “the prediction I made in Washington [twelve days ago.] Tremendous air strikes have had fearful effect on the enemy, and our ground troops have followed up and are fighting their hearts out. Right now the initiative just may pass to us at any moment.”4 Truman jotted down “thank Frank for me.” Neither he nor his personal agent drew the logical conclusion that Inchon was not necessary now that US/ UN forces were winning the war at the Naktong. Lowe had fallen under MacArthur ’s aura. The Department of Defense was also disarmed, especially the The War against North Korea ✪ 101 navy, although the chief of naval operations planted a new deputy chief of staff for the commander of the naval component in Far East military headquarters. “Send a personal radio dispatch to me directly at least once a day,” Forrest Sherman told Arleigh Burke. “I want you...

Share